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This research studies Adequacy Decisions, the Safe Harbour and the Privacy Shield, under which transfers of personal data from 
the European Union to the United States are facilitated. The focus is on ‘redress mechanisms’, thus the mechanisms under which 
EU citizens can seek redress or compensation against violations of data protection rules. The research assesses the redress 
mechanisms of the Privacy Shield in the Light of the Court of Justice of the European Union case Schrems. Firstly the Safe Har-
bour Decision and its redress mechanisms are introduced. Then the Schrems case where the Safe Harbour was invalidated is ana-
lysed. Focus is on what the Court says about redress mechanisms, and the criteria that it establishes for the assessment of Ade-
quacy Decisions. This criteria is then applied to the Privacy Shield redress mechanisms. 
 
According to the criteria, an Adequacy Decision must fulfil the requirements set out in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, thus right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. The different redress mechanisms of the Privacy Shield are assessed in 
light of this Article by using case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as European Court of Human Rights. 
The study finds that all the redress mechanisms are not in line with Article 47. More specifically there are deficiencies in terms of 
the remedies available under different redress options, also all the procedures cannot be considered ‘fair’ as required by Article 47. 
More specifically, there is not always an opportunity for inter partes proceedings or a reasoned decision. Also the independence 
and impartiality of some of the dispute resolution bodies is questionable. Moreover, the complexity of the Privacy Shield redress 
mechanisms may in some situations mean that the time of the proceedings may exceed what would be considered reasonable 
from the perspective of European law. 
 
The redress of mechanisms of the Privacy Shield rely heavily on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The compatibility with Arti-
cle 47 of the Charter and ADR is not discussed as such, although the requirement of mandatory ADR before judicial dispute reso-
lution is considered. Instead, the study asks whether the ADR mechanisms of the Privacy Shield could be compatible with Artic le 
47. 
 
This study is done from a European perspective, thus focusing on EU fundamental rights. Study of laws of the United States are 
left outside the scope of the research, although some references are made. Similarly the study of redress mechanisms is limited to 
those introduced in the Privacy Shield and routes to seek redress in US courts are excluded. The aim of this study is thus to as-
sess whether the Privacy Shield would pass the criteria established by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its Schrems 
case. The study takes a fundamental right perspective, although it does recognize that European data protection law does have 
other objectives other than the protection of personal data, such as economic objectives.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Significance of EU Data Protection 
 
Data has become very important in today’s digitalized world. The European Commission calls 
it ‘the currency of today’s digital economy’.1 Many ‘free’ online services, such as Facebook or 
Google search, are actually funded by collecting personal data of the people who use these 
services. Personal data has immense economic value and potential. The free flow brings many 
benefits to the society at large allowing the realization of many values, such as freedom of 
expression, economic growth or disaster relief. Individuals also benefit from the wide variety 
of services offered to them. In the modern world individual states have become more interde-
pendent and the flow of data across borders allows development in many areas, governments 
need to co-operate with each other.2 Overall data flows can bring prosperity and thus be bene-
ficial to all. 
For the European Union, the United States is arguably one of the most important trading part-
ners. Data flows between across the Atlantic can multiply trade and bring remarkable economic 
gains. That marketplace consist of for half of world GDP with addition to 2,4 trillion euros 
worth of bilateral investments.3 The exact amount of data crossing the Atlantic may be impos-
sible to calculate, but statistics certainly support the view that internet data traffic is on the rise.4 
The substantial growth of cross-border data flows have also been recognised at the EU. The 
data protection law reform that is ongoing in the Union specifically mentions the importance 
technological developments and their influence to social and economic integration and the rapid 
growth of data flows.5   
Despite all these economic advantages, there are also threats to the privacy of individual EU 
citizens, as well as national governments or businesses.6 For individuals, who are the main 
                                                          
1 European Commission, MEMO/15/6385, (2015). 
2 Kuner, (2013), pp. 102‒103. 
3 ECIPE Report, (2013), p. 6. 
4 Cisco, White Paper, (2016).  
5 Preamble, paras. 5‒6, Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (General Data Protection Regulation),  
6 Kuner, (2013), pp. 103‒104. 
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interest of this thesis, processing of their personal data can also lead to tragic results, such as 
public embarrassment, risk of financial loss or decisions that affect the life of the individual, 
credit granting or recruitment.7 Most commonly, data is collected when individuals use online 
services. Companies and organisations then use it to their advantage, e.g. for targeted market-
ing, or the data can be even sold on to different companies. Oftentimes the individual does not 
even know what data different companies might have, and for what purpose it is being used. 
Technological advancements have been seen as threats to privacy, not just the recent rise of 
internet and the mass collection of personal data online, but for instance the development of 
photography in the late 19th century caused concerns for the privacy of an individual human 
being. Warren and Brandeis argued already in 1890 in their famous article, that privacy is right 
that every individual inherently has. Also they though that interference with this privacy should 
be remedied.8 This is why data protection legislation is needed. 
EU data protection legislation has two objectives. On the other hand it seeks to ensure the free 
flow of personal data and, on the other it seeks to protect privacy, thus more specifically there 
is protection of personal data. The objectives are enshrined also in secondary EU data protection 
legislation.9 Although this research is not directly concerned of the objectives of the data pro-
tection legislation, they are, nevertheless issues that must be borne in mind, while discussing 
data protection. 
European data protection legislation is the most developed in the world. In fact, data protection 
is a fundamental right according to Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter 
referred to as the Charter), which states: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the 
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of 
access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority10 
 
                                                          
7 Kuner, (2013), pp. 104‒105. 
8 Warren and Brandeis, (1890). 
9 See e.g. Art. 1 Directive 95/46/EC, Data Protection Directive, and Art. 1, General Data Protection Regulation. 
10 Art. 8, Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
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European data protection is based on the idea of autonomy or self-determination.11 This means, 
in the context of the EU, that the data can be collected for specified legitimate purpose and 
processed fairly.12 The data protection rules would be empty if they could not be enforced. 
Individuals must have the opportunity to enforce the right and also seek compensation when 
the rules are violated.   
Therefore ensuring effective redress is essential in giving effect to the right of data protection. 
By ‘redress mechanisms’ I mean the mechanisms, or the ability or opportunity of EU citizens 
to seek some form of compensation or remedy in case there is a violation or breach of the data 
protection rules. The Commission also recognizes that ensuring effective redress in data pro-
tection issues is essential in guaranteeing the right.13 To effectively ensure the ability to seek 
redress it is essential to guarantee means to seek it, which could be judicial or non-judicial. The 
traditional option is in front of a court, that the can afford a monetary compensation, but differ-
ent out-of-court options, such as arbitration or mediation can sometimes be equally good, if not 
even better. Also, effective remedies do not necessarily need to be monetary. The non-judicial 
redress options are called Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). 
An important provision is Article 47 of the Charter that protects the access to justice and also 
effective remedy. It states:   
 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right 
to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Arti-
cle. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being ad-
vised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is 
necessary to ensure effective access to justice.14 
 
                                                          
11 It is considered that individuals must have effective control over their personal data online. See e.g. Commu-
nication from the Commission, 25.1.2012, p. 2. 
12 See e.g. Art. 6(1), Data Protection Directive, and Art. 5(1), General Data Protection Regulation. 
13 Communication from the Commission, 25.1.2012, p. 6 
14 Art. 47, Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
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This provision is essential in guaranteeing the right of data protection (Article 8 of the Charter) 
in the last place. Whether Article 47 is compatible with non-judicial ADR mechanisms is a 
complicated issue, which is not the main focus of this study. 
In the context of the EU, equally important to Article 47 of the Charter is Article 6 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as ECHR), which guarantees eve-
ryone the right to a fair trial. Article 6.1 of the ECHR states: 
 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and 
public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or 
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the 
private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court 
in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.15 
 
The Charter and the Convention have a very close relationship and corresponding rights have 
the same meaning. Also the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter re-
ferred to as ECtHR) is equally important in the context of the EU as the Court of justice of the 
EU (hereinafter referred to as CJEU) case law in the interpretation of these provisions.16 Access 
to fair trial and right to an effective remedy ensure the effectiveness of the fundamental right of 
protection of personal data. By ‘effectiveness’ I merely mean what it means in the context of 
Article 47 of the Charter, thus an effective remedy. 
However, when data is transferred across the Atlantic to the United States, there is a problem. 
The question is whether the protection can extend also to situations where data is transferred to 
third countries. According to the European Commission it should extend.17 The US approach 
to protection of personal data is different from the EU thinking of protecting personal data as a 
fundamental right. Certain data is seen as a commodity that the data subject can choose to re-
veal, and it can be traded for another good. Individual is responsible for his or her own data.18 
                                                          
15 Art. 6.1, European Convention on Human Rights 
16 Handbook on European law relating to access to justice, (2016), pp. 11‒13. See also Preamble, Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
17 Communication form the Commission, 25.1.2012, p. 10‒11. 
18 Markel, (2006), p. 1. See also Kobrin, (2014), p. 116‒117. 
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Industry self-regulation and technological mechanisms are a norm in the US, which differs 
vastly from the European approach to data protection.19 Data protection laws in the US are 
piecemeal, sectoral and generally only apply to public institutions and not private ones.20 The 
approach is thus rather ‘market protecting’ than ‘individual protecting’.21 A particularly big 
blow to the safety of personal data online came after the revelations of Edward Snowden in 
2013. Snowden revealed that US authorities has a surveillance programme called Prism, which 
allowed US government’s National Security Agency (NSA) to tap some leading internet firms, 
such as Facebook, Google and Microsoft, which have access to personal data of EU citizens. 22 
The Snowden revelations created distrust towards US data collectors and processors. The US 
approach being so different ensuring EU level of data protection when data is transferred seems 
difficult. 
EU has solved this problem by allowing transfers of personal data from the Union to third 
countries only when the third country in question has adequate level of data protection. From 
the perspective of the EU the US data protection laws are not adequate. Thus the EU and the 
EU have a bilateral agreement that established a regime under which transfers of personal data 
could take place. In this study, such an agreement is called an ‘Adequacy Decision’. The first 
Adequacy Decision was called ‘Safe Harbour’ and it was recently replaced by a new regime 
called ‘Privacy Shield’. 
 
 
1.2. Scope of the Study 
 
In this research I shall study the aforementioned Safe Harbour and the Privacy Shield. I am 
going to compare them and assess the changes that have been made. But I will not study all the 
aspects of these agreements, but rather I shall focus only on so called redress mechanisms. This 
is significant because, as already discussed above, the effectiveness of the data protection rules 
                                                          
19 Reidenberg, (2001-2002), p. 726. 
20 Blanke, (2000-2001), p. 66. 
21 See e.g. Reidenberg, (2001-2002), p. 726 and 731. 
22 Greenwald, (2013). See also: Khan, Part 1, (2016), p. 4. 
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is largely dependent on their enforcement. And the rules would be meaningless for the individ-
uals if they could not get any compensation for the loss suffered as a result of violation of the 
rules.  
The new Privacy Shield, which recently replaced the Safe Harbour regime is meant to correct 
the flaws and deficiencies of the Safe Harbour. Amongst other things it is meant to provide 
better protection and easier redress.23 I am going to assess whether it really does that. At the 
centre of my research is the CJEU case that invalidated the Safe Harbour, the Schrems.24 In the 
case the Court established a criteria to assess Adequacy Decision such as the Privacy Shield or 
the Safe Harbour. Article 47 of the Charter which I mentioned above is an important element 
in the CJEU’s decision. Max Schrems himself (the applicant in the Schrems case) has his res-
ervations whether the Privacy Shield actually delivers everything that it says it does.25 
Hence, the objective is to apply these criteria to the Privacy Shield to assess the effectiveness 
of the redress mechanisms. Firstly, I shall look at the Safe Harbour, more specifically the re-
dress mechanisms and the Schrems case and see why the Safe Harbour failed. Then I shall 
compare the redress mechanisms of the Safe Harbour to the ones in the Privacy Shield and see 
if there is any improvement. As will be seen, the Privacy Shield (and the Safe Harbour) rely 
heavily on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The compatibility of this type of redress with 
Article 47 is not, as stated, the main focus. Therefore I shall not directly question whether ADR 
can be effective as opposed to a court. This thesis is not meant to enter the discussion about 
whether disputes are better solved by judicial or non-judicial means. Instead, I only assess the 
ADR options offered in light of the Schrems criteria, without comparing whether judicial means 
would be more effective. Hence I am open to the idea that ADR can be as effective.  
With these considerations the research questions shall be the following: 
 
1. What changes has the Privacy Shield introduced in terms of redress mechanisms in 
comparison to the Safe Harbour?  
 
2. Would the Privacy Shield pass the test established by the CJEU in the Schrems case on 
part of the redress mechanisms?  
                                                          
23 European Commission, Press release, IP/16/2461, 12 July 2016. 
24 Case C‑362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, joined party: Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. 
(Case C‑362/14, Schrems case) 
25 Schrems, (2016), p. 148. 
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The study is limited to assessing the Privacy Shield (and the Safe Harbour).  While recognising 
that EU citizens ability to seek compensation for data protection violations may not be limited 
to the options listed in the Privacy Shield, for research economic reasons I shall limit my re-
search. Redress mechanism outside the Privacy Shield are not assessed. For this reason I will 
not look very deep into US legislation, for instance, although I will make references to it 
throughout the thesis. My point of view in this study is European. Hence, I shall be discussing 
the issues from the perspective of EU law and perhaps most importantly fundamental rights. I 
am interested in the protection of personal data of EU citizens. 
In addition to the fundamental rights perspective, the economic perspective is perhaps equally 
important when it comes to data protection. As mentioned EU data protection legislation has 
two objectives, the protection of data and free flow of data to realise its economic advantages.  
There is a tension between these two objectives, and neither of them can be fully attained. Too 
protectionist approach is going to stop the flow of data and lead to economic loss and the op-
posite approach of allowing the free flow without any limitations undermines individual pri-
vacy. This is an important factor to consider also remember that the CJEU case law could also 
has its effect on the economy, especially if it set the standard of protection too high. However, 
this study is mainly focused on the fundamental rights aspect. I shall only refer to the implica-
tions on economy towards the end of this thesis. 
The study of redress mechanisms is also interesting because there are two applications pending 
at the CJEU. The Court has not given decisions, but when it does, it will likely to answer ques-
tion about the effectiveness of redress mechanisms under the Privacy Shield. The two applica-
tion have been put forward by Digital Rights Ireland and La Quadrature du Net. 
Digital Rights Ireland, an Irish interest group, has filed an application for annulment at the 
CJEU of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 of the so called 
Privacy Shield decision.26  In its action the group has presented ten pleas of law, of which only 
the two that are relevant here shall be discussed. They argue inter alia certain provisions of a 
US law FISA Amendments ACT 200827 that allows authorities to access content of electronic 
communications is not concordant with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
right to an effective remedy and a fair trial. Secondly they also argue that the Privacy Shield 
                                                          
26 Case T-670/16, Digital Rights Ireland v Commission. 
27 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 2008. 
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Decision denies Europeans the right to an effective remedy contrary to the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights and the General Principles, insofar as the decision allows access of public au-
thorities to data or alternatively fails to provide adequate safeguards against such access and 
fails to provide an effective remedy.28   
Also a French group, called La Quadrature du Net, which also promotes data protection rights, 
has also brought and action for annulment of the Privacy Shield. They are arguing that the 
Privacy Shield is contrary to Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter. Their first argument is that the 
US regime is contrary to the essence of Article 7. Secondly, they argue that the Privacy Shield 
does not guarantee the protection of fundamental rights equivalent to EU standards. Thirdly, 
US regulatory regime does not provide an effective remedy, thus it is not equivalent. And finally 
the Privacy Shield is wrong because it does not assure protection which is equivalent (to EU 
protection).29 
 
 
1.3. Data Protection Terminology 
 
For the purposes of this research it is useful to discuss some terminological issues. My choice 
of terminology is European rather than American. ‘Data protection’ is better known as ‘(data) 
privacy’ in the United States. The reasons for this difference lie in the historical development 
of data protection. In the US the beginnings of the concept were in privacy considerations, 
whereas the European data protection rules were inspired by the German term Datenschutz 
where it was translated into the English version of data protection.30 Further discussions about 
the differences in terminology on the sides of the Atlantic is not required but here it is just useful 
to note that in this research I will be using the European term data protection. 
Then data, or more specifically ‘personal data’ has to be defined. As the interest of this research 
is on the redress mechanism offered to individuals in case of data breaches in transatlantic data 
transfer situations, it is only ‘personal data’ that is at the centre of the study. Thus mere data or 
data that is not personal is not considered here. ‘Personal data’ refers to according to the Data 
                                                          
28 Case T-670/16, Digital Rights Ireland v Commission. 
29 Case T-738/16, La Quadrature du Net and Others v Commission. 
30 Gonzáles Fuster, (2014), p. 56 
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Protection Directive ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity’.31 The GDPR definition 
of ‘personal data’ is similar but some factors have been added, namely ‘a name, an identification 
number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, 
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person’.32 
Hidden in the definition of data protection is also a term ‘data subject’, the natural person to 
whom the data in question refers to. 
‘Data transfer’ happens when data is transferred from one country to another, transfer to a third 
country in the European context mean transfers to countries outside the EU. According to Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Privacy Guidelines, trans-
border flows of data mean movement of data across national borders.33 The first European piece 
of data protection legislation, Convention 108 Article 12(1) on the other hand defines it as a 
‘transfer across national borders, by whatever medium, of personal data undergoing automatic 
processing or collected with a view to their being automatically processed’.34 The CJEU has 
ruled in a case called Lindqvist that if data was located on a European server and accessed from 
outside the EU, that would not constitute a data transfer for the purposes of EU data protection 
law.35 Kuner does not think that this decision is very helpful in defining a data transfer since 
the decision was based on certain technical factors and speculates that the decision was at least 
partly affected by the facts in question and considering that it was small scale. A company 
handling large amount of data online would more likely fall within the data transfer definition. 36 
However, it is to be noted that in the context of the internet it is not always clear that the transfer 
has taken place at all, since the data could still be physically located on a European server, but 
only accessed from the United States. In fact, data transfer is rather an ongoing process.37 Ac-
cording to Gonzáles Fuster it is not really the movement or flow of data which is in question, 
                                                          
31 Article 2, Data Protection Directive. 
32 Art. 4(1), General Data Protection Regulation. 
33 § 1(c), OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2013). 
34 Article 12(1), Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data 1981 (Convention 108).  
35 Case C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist, paras 60‒61, 68 and 70. 
36 Kuner, (2007), p. 81‒83. 
37 Kuner, (2013), p. 11.  
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but rather just different data processing activities which may raise questions of conflict of 
laws.38 However, considerations whether data transfer has taken place are outside the scope of 
this research, the focus is on situations where it has taken place and there has been a breach of 
some kind. 
I already mentioned above what I mean by ‘redress’, but for the purposes of this study it is 
necessary to clearly define what is meant by it. Oxford English Dictionary defines it as ‘repa-
ration or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss’ and ‘remedy for or relief from trou-
ble’.39 This is what I also mean by ‘redress’. Thus some sort of compensation or damages 
awarded to repair the loss suffered as a result of data protection rules being breached. These 
could be monetary compensations or something else. The Privacy Shield, which is the focus of 
this study, offers a range of non-monetary compensations, such as correction or deleting the 
personal data. Redress mechanism is then a way to seek this redress. Usually redress is sought 
through judicial means, but as will be seen there are also other ways. 
Still useful to note are terms ‘data processor’ and ‘data controller’. ‘Data processor’ is an or-
ganisation that processes personal data. There are multiple ways the processing could take 
place.40 ‘Controller’ on the other hand determines the means and purposes of the processing. 41 
Both could be legal or natural persons.  
 
 
1.4. Methodology 
 
Multiple methods are used in this research. Firstly, doctrinal law research is used.  Doctrinal 
law research studies legal texts and how to interpret them.42 The research is going to look into 
the legal documents relating to data protection, most importantly the official documents of the 
Safe Harbour and the Privacy Shield. EU data protection legislation will also be discussed, 
particular secondary legislation, such as the Data Protection Directive of 1995, which is the 
legal basis for the Safe Harbour Decision. Additionally the thesis will also look into the new 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and what changes it will bring to the field of data 
                                                          
38 González Fuster, (2016), p. 162. 
39 Oxford English Dictionary online. 
40 See Art. 2(b) and (e), Data Protection Directive and Art. 4(2) and (8), General Data Protection Regulation. 
41 Art. 2(d), Data Protection Directive and Art. 4(7), General Data Protection Regulation. 
42 Hirvonen, (2011), p. 36. 
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transfers and redress mechanisms. Also important are the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
This research is done from a European perspective, hence detailed analysis of US law is outside 
the scope of this thesis. Additionally study and analysis of case law will be included. Most 
importantly the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the most im-
portant case for this study is the Schrems case, but I shall also be looking into other cases in 
order to determine the status of data protection in the EU and also define what effective redress 
is in the European case law. Some cases from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
are also be included in the research because they help in determining the status and extent of 
the European right to data protection and also the right to seek redress (or effective remedy).  
Comparative Law method is also used to compare the redress mechanism of the Safe Harbour 
and the Privacy Shield. In the academic field there is some disagreement as to what is meant by 
comparative law method and as to how objective it can be.43 In this study, however, compara-
tive law methods means a simple comparison, i.e. I am looking at two different objects and 
seeing what is different and similar between them. 
Additionally some law in policy oriented discussion will be included. As data protection often 
has to be reconciled against other interests, such as economic, I shall be discussing this tension 
between these two interests. Legal research has often used other disciplines, such as sociology 
or economics, to look at law from a different perspective.44 However, I shall not be using law 
and economics type of method, as I am not directly interested in the economic effects of the 
Privacy Shield, but rather only the tension between data protection and the economic interest 
of data. 
This thesis also covers multiple fields of law. European law is at the centre point, but also 
information law, comparative law, procedural law and private international law are used. I shall 
asses the Safe Harbour and more importantly the Privacy Shield by using Europeans law, most 
importantly the case law of the CJEU. Data protection itself encompasses multiple areas of law. 
It has become part of European law, but perhaps most obviously it is part of information law. 
Since the focus is on the ability of EU citizens to seek redress through (non-)judicial means this 
study thus also encompasses procedural law. Finally, since the jurisdictional conflict between 
                                                          
43 Glanert, (2012), pp. 61‒70. 
44 Hirvonen, (2011), p. 28. 
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the EU and the US in matter of data protection is discussed, the thesis does also touch on the 
law of conflicts, i.e. private international law. 
 
 
1.5. Structure of the Thesis 
 
In Chapter 2 the background and objectives of European data protection law will be discussed. 
I shall focus specifically why such Adequacy Decisions, such as the Safe Harbour and the Pri-
vacy Shield are needed. In that Chapter I shall also analyse the Safe Harbour Decision and more 
specifically the redress mechanism that were offered in that regime. I will also discuss the fa-
mous Schrems case that lead to the invalidation of the Safe Harbour. I will discuss the weak-
nesses of the Safe Harbour and analyse why it failed and also introduce the criteria that the 
CJEU established to assess Adequacy Decisions. The following Chapter 3 shall then discuss 
the Privacy Shield Decision and most importantly the redress mechanisms of that regime. This 
study will find that there has been some significant changes in terms of redress mechanisms 
offered, the Privacy Shield has introduced new options to seek redress. However, the main focus 
of this thesis is to assess the Privacy Shield redress mechanisms. In Chapter 4 I shall assess the 
redress mechanisms using the CJEU criteria that was established in the Schrems case. I will 
review them by using European case law, both CJEU case law and also ECtHR case law, to 
determine whether the Privacy Shield would pass the Schrems criteria. The research shall find 
that the new redress mechanisms do not fulfil all the requirements, despite there has been nota-
ble improvements. In the final Chapter I will then discuss more specifically, why I think that 
the Privacy Shield would not pass the CJEU criteria on part of the redress mechanisms. I shall 
also briefly discuss the tension between data protection and the economic objective of data 
protection legislation. I shall also review some suggestions that have been introduced to solve 
the problems with the Privacy Shield redress mechanisms and introduce my own ideas. 
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2. Background to the Study: EU Data Protection Law and the 
Safe Harbour 
 
 
2.1. EU Data Protection Law  
 
Before going ahead for the main topic of comparing the Safe Harbour and the Privacy Shield, 
it is useful first take a look at data protection law in the European Union and more specifically 
why such a regime as the Safe Harbour or the Privacy Shield is required for transatlantic data 
transfers. A brief overview of the main legislation and the objectives of EU data protection 
legislation is required at this point. In this part I shall firstly briefly explain how data protection 
became part of Union legislation and eventually became a fundamental right. Secondly, I shall 
look at secondary legislation, which relates to data protection. And thirdly, I will discuss Ade-
quacy Decisions.  
 
2.1.1. Objectives and Fundamental Rights 
 
The basis for EU data protection legislation is found not only in fundamental right considera-
tions but also concerns about the functioning of the internal market. A detailed analysis of the 
emergence of EU data protection law is outside the scope of this research, but at this point it is 
necessary to note that the emergence of European data protection legislation has from the be-
ginning been coloured by both human rights and internal market considerations. The develop-
ment of EU data protection law was also influenced by 1980 Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines45  and Convention 10846, which both stressed 
the importance of both protecting privacy while simultaneously ensuring free flow of infor-
mation.47 In fact the internal market considerations were more important in the beginning since 
the EU was early considered to be more of an economic union than a protector of human rights. 
It was considered that data protection was necessary for the functioning of the internal market 
                                                          
45 See Preface, OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines governing the Protection of Pri-
vacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (23 September 1980).  
46 Preamble, (Convention 108). 
47 González Fuster, (2014), p. 111‒122. 
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and the actualisation of the four freedoms. Free flow of personal data was necessary for the 
European Union. 
According to Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity applies 
to Union decision making.48 The competences of the Union are based on the principle of con-
ferral and actions which do not fall exclusively within the Union competence, the Union may 
act only if it is considered that the objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member state 
acting independently. Hence the objectives are better achieved by collective Union action rather 
than Member States acting individually. This was the case for data protection and how it be-
came to fall within the Union competences. Union interest in data protection started already in 
the 1970s when there started to be concerns of US dominance in the area and perhaps more 
importantly the fear of divergent laws across the Union. Data protection was deemed to be of 
constitutional importance to the Union.49   
Data protection has also been included in the EU treaties. Relevant provision in the Treaties, 
are Article 39 TEU50 and Article 16 TFEU51, which relate to the EU competence in data pro-
tection issues. For the purposes of this study, however, more important is Article 8 of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights52, according to which data protection is a fundamental right. Data 
protection was in the end included as separate provision to privacy, even though there had been 
discussion whether it was in fact separate.53 The Charter became legally binding and equivalent 
with the EU Treaties with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.54  According to 
Article 6(1) of the TEU, it has same value as the Treaties.55 Hence, not only is protection of 
personal data recognized as a fundamental right, the data protection legislation of the EU has 
from the beginning also had the objective of ensuring the free flow of data.  
 
                                                          
48 Article 5, Treaty on the European Union. 
49 González Fuster, (2014), p. 112. 
50 Art. 39, Treaty in the European Union. Under this provision the Council has the authority to lay down rules 
relating to data protection when the activities fall within the scope of Chapter 2 of the TEU. 
51 Art. 16, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Under Art. 16(1) everyone has the right of data 
protection and under Art. 16(2) the European Parliament and the Council can lay down rules relating to data 
protection with regard to processing by EU institutions and Member States when they are doing activities that 
fall within the scope of EU law, as well as rules relating to free movement of personal data. 
52 Art. 8, The Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
53 González Fuster, (2014), pp. 195‒198. 
54 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, website of the European Commission. 
55 Art. 6(1), Treaty on the European Union. 
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2.1.2. Data Protection in Secondary Legislation of the EU 
 
The central pieces of legislation are Directive 95/46/EC more commonly known as the Data 
Protection Directive (Hereinafter referred to as the Data Protection Directive or the DPD)56 and 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679, or the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter referred to 
as the GDPR).57 EU data protection law is going through a reform and a new piece of legisla-
tion, the GDPR shall replace the Data Protection Directive. It is going to become fully applica-
ble in May 2018.58  
First of all the DPD, the name of the Directive ‘on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data’ already reveals its pur-
pose, it is meant to protect individuals with regard to processing of personal data and on the 
other hand it is meant to ‘protect’ free movement of data. These same objectives are also stated 
in Article 1 of the Directive. Recitals 1‒6 of the Preamble also state that economic integration 
and the internal market require the free flow of data across Member States and recitals 8 and 9 
of the Preamble speak of the need to harmonize data protection laws across the Union.59 When 
the DPD was adopted there were both internal market considerations relating to free movement 
and also the concern for the need to ensure the right to privacy which was understood as a 
general principle of Union law.60 Secondly the GDPR echoes the same two objectives of ensur-
ing protection of natural persons with regard to processing of personal data while simultane-
ously ensuring the free flow of such data.61 These two pieces of legislation thus further empha-
size the importance of the dual objectives of the EU data protection legislation.  
 
2.1.3. Adequacy Decisions 
 
I already mentioned in Chapter 1 that transferring personal data to third countries, such as the 
US, is only possible if the data protection in that third country in question is adequate. The legal 
basis for this is found in the DPD. Article 25 paragraphs 1 and 2 state: 
 
                                                          
56 Directive 95/46/EC, (Data Protection Directive). 
57 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (General Data Protection Regulation). 
58 GDPR website. 
59 Preamble recitals 1‒6, 8 and 9, Data Protection Directive.  
60 González Fuster, (2014), p. 126. 
61 See paras. 2 and 3 of the Preamble and Art. 1, General Data Protection Regulation. 
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1. The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of personal data which are 
undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer may take place only if, without 
prejudice to compliance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of 
this Directive, the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection. 
 
2. The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the light 
of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer operations; 
particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the 
proposed processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, 
the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the profes-
sional rules and security measures which are complied with in that country.62 
 
The European Commission was given the power to decide on the adequacy of a given third 
state by the Council and the European Parliament.63 In this study, these decisions are called 
‘Adequacy Decisions’.64 The Commission can make a decision as to the adequacy of the data 
protection laws of a certain third country on the basis Article 25 (6) of the DPD which states: 
 
6. The Commission may find, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 31 (2), that a 
third country ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Arti-
cle, by reason of its domestic law or of the international commitments it has entered into, particularly 
upon conclusion of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5, for the protection of the private lives 
and basic freedoms and rights of individuals.65 
 
The exact procedure of determining adequacy is not relevant here. It suffices to note what the 
Commission needs to consider. Article 25 (2) of the DPD states that ‘all the circumstances’ 
have to be taken into account.  The Article 29 Working Party66 (WP29) had laid down some 
                                                          
62 Article 25(1) and (2), Data Protection Directive. 
63 Commission decisions on the adequacy of the protection of personal data in third countries, Website of the 
European Commission.  
64 However Adequacy Decisions are not the only means of transferring data to third countries. Under Article 
26(2), Data protection Directive, transfers are allowed where there are ‘appropriate contractual clauses’. These 
can be either Model Contractual Clauses (MCCs) or Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs). 
65 Article 25(6), Data Protection Directive. 
66 Article 29 Working Party is a body created by the Data Protection Directive to work as an independent advi-
sor in the field of data protection. Even though the body cannot make binding decisions, the advisory opinions 
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guidelines as to what are the factors that need to be taken into account. The most interesting 
ones out of those for the purposes of this research are procedural and enforcement mechanisms, 
which in particular ought to include good level of compliance first of all, support and help to 
the individual in the exercise of the their rights and lastly appropriate redress in case of inju-
ries.67  
Under the new regulation (GDPR) which is about to replace the Data Protection Directive there 
is a similar provision granting the Commission the power to make an Adequacy Decision, Ar-
ticle 45.68 It is more detailed, specifically paying attention to human rights and rule of law, 
effectiveness of supervisory authority and commitments made by the third country in question 
in relation to data protection.69 As with the DPD Article 25 (1), according to Article 45 (1) of 
the GDPR transfers are allowed only when the third country ensures adequate level of protec-
tion.70   
Similarly as under the DPD rules, the Commission can make a decision about the adequate level 
of data protection in the country in question, according to Article 45 (3) of the Regulation.71 
The provision introduces two significant changes. First of all, the GDPR codifies that the Ade-
quacy Decisions may be limited to a territory or a specific sector. Additionally periodic reviews 
of adequacy are required. However, as regards to what need to be taken into consideration in 
determining the adequacy of the level of data protection in a given country, the GDPR intro-
duces a very detailed provision. According to Article 45 (2) the Commission must in particular 
pay attention to ‘respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms’, ‘effective and enforceable 
data subject rights and effective administrative and judicial redress for the data subjects whose 
personal data are being transferred’ as well as enforcement issues amongst other things.72  
                                                          
of the Working Party have significance. It works as sort of a mediator between Member States and the Com-
mission bringing the opinions about data protection from the state level to the Commission as well as promot-
ing uniform application of the DPD principles at state level, advising the Commission about data protection is-
sues and issuing recommendations. Article 29 and 30, Data Protection Directive. See also the website of the 
European Data Protection Supervisor, and also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party tasks. See also Article 
1, Article 29 Working Party Rules of Procedure. 
67 WP29 Working Document, (1998), p. 6‒7. 
68 Article 45, General Data Protection Regulation. 
69 Bräutigam, (2016), p. 148. 
70 Article 45(1), General Data Protection Regulation. 
71 Article 45(3), General Data Protection Regulation. 
72 Article 45(2), General Data Protection Regulation. 
18 
   
The changes in the legislation will be relevant to my analysis of the redress mechanisms of the 
Privacy Shield, as the CJEU would potentially take the new regulations into consideration if it 
were to assess the Privacy Shield.  
 
 
2.2. Rise and Fall of the Safe Harbour 
 
In this part I will briefly summarize what the Safe Harbour was and what where the redress 
mechanisms under that regime. Then I shall review the CJEU case, where the Safe Harbour 
was invalidated, and the criteria for assessing Adequacy Decisions was established. 
 
 
2.2.1. Safe Harbour Decision 
 
The Safe Harbour was an Adequacy Decision that the Commission made according to Article 
25(6) of the DPD73 to comply with the requirement of adequate data protection as required in 
Article 25(1) in that same Directive.74 Under that regime data could be transferred from the EU 
to the US. The Commission passed the decision 2000/520/EC in July 2000 (hereinafter referred 
to as the Safe Harbour Decision).75  
The differences between the US and EU approach to data protection was one of the main rea-
sons for the Safe Harbour decision, to ensure the flow of data across the Atlantic and promote 
commerce. As already described in Chapter 1 the US approach to data protection in fundamen-
tally different and Adequacy Decision is a way to solve this problem. Engagement in transat-
lantic commerce, from the perspective of the EU, is a threat to data protection, or at least how 
it is understood in the EU. In cross-border situations, conflict of law may materialize and par-
                                                          
73 Art. 25(6), Data Protection Directive. 
74 Art. 25(1), Data Protection Directive. 
75 2000/520/EC, ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’. 
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ticularly in data protection issues questions of jurisdiction and enforcement are unclear. There-
fore cooperation between the EU and the US in data protection issues is a way of circumventing 
these hurdles.76  
Thus the Safe Harbour was basically a framework under which US organizations (private com-
panies or public organisations) could transfer personal data of EU citizens to the US while still 
complying with the EU data protection laws.77 The regime was self-certifying, US companies 
wishing to participate had to inform the US Department of Commerce (hereinafter referred to 
as DoC) that they would adhere with the Safe Harbour rules.78 The Safe Harbour regime was 
an ‘extraordinary’ Adequacy Decision in the sense that it did not make all transfers of personal 
data from the EU to the US possible and thus ‘deciding’ that US has adequate level of data 
protection. Rather, since the US did not have adequate data protection, the Safe Harbour offered 
an optional set of rules that organisations could voluntarily adhere to satisfy with the adequacy 
requirement of EU law. Thus the Safe Harbour was a ‘partial’ Adequacy Decision, only certain 
type of transfers were allowed.79 
The Safe Harbour was in many ways a compromise. There was a need to ensure the free flow 
of data at the both sides of the Atlantic, but then there was the problem that European law did 
not allow data transfers unless the destination country offered adequate protection, and the US 
sectoral self-regulating system did not meet the European requirements. Nor was there any po-
litical will in the US to change the law. There was the danger of potential enforcement actions 
in Europe and showdown judgement in the US, the Safe Harbour offered a way to delay these 
potential threats.80   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 DiLascio, (2004), p. 400. 
77 Rotenberg and Jacobs, (2013), p. 638. 
78 Khan, Part 1, (2016), p. 3. See also ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex II, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), 
FAQ 6. 
79 Kuner, (2007), p. 175. 
80 Reidenberg, (2001-2002), p. 739‒740. 
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2.2.2. Structure of the Safe Harbour and Redress Mechanisms 
 
The Safe Harbour Decision contained a set of Safe Harbour Privacy Principles (‘Principles’) 
and a set of Frequently Asked Questions (‘FAQs’), included in Annexes I and II respectively.81 
The purpose of the Principles was to ensure that the US organisations collecting and processing 
EU citizens personal data would do so in a way that would be deemed adequate from the EU 
perspective and thus facilitating commerce between the EU and the US.82 To qualify those 
organisations had to apply the Principles for transfers of personal data of EU citizens across the 
Atlantic.83 The FAQs, on the other hand, were meant to be more specific guidance as to how to 
apply the Principles.84  Here only the Principles and FAQs which relate to EU citizens redress 
opportunities will be discussed. 
The Safe Harbour had seven data processing principles that US companies had to comply with. 
Those were Notice, Choice, Onward Transfer, Security, Data Integrity, Access and Enforce-
ment.85 From these the Enforcement Principle is obviously the most relevant, although it cannot 
be said that any of the seven principles would be irrelevant, since failure to comply with any of 
the Principles would have potentially amounted to a breach thus giving rise to action for redress. 
However, since the focus is on the redress mechanisms, only the Enforcement Principle shall 
be discussed.  
Hence, the Enforcement Principle of the Safe Harbour stated:  
Effective privacy protection must include mechanisms for assuring compliance with the Princi-
ples, recourse for individuals to whom the data relate affected by non-compliance with the Prin-
ciples, and consequences for the organization when the Principles are not followed. At a minimum, 
such mechanisms must include 
(a) readily available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms by which each individual's 
complaints and disputes are investigated and resolved by reference to the Principles and damages 
awarded where the applicable law or private sector initiatives so provide;  
(b) follow up procedures for verifying that the attestations and assertions businesses make about 
their privacy practices are true and that privacy practices have been implemented as presented; 
and  
                                                          
81 US law applied to questions of interpretation and compliance with the Principles and Frequently Asked Ques-
tions. See ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex I, Safe Habor Privacy Principles, para. 6. The advantage of this 
was that US companies were likely to be comfortable with their own domestic law. See Kuner, (2007), p. 182‒
183. 
82 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex I, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, para 2. 
83 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex I, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, para 5. 
84 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Art. 1. 
85 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex I, Safe Habor Privacy Principles. See also: Kuner, (2007), p. 187. 
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(c) obligations to remedy problems arising out of failure to comply with the Principles by organi-
zations announcing their adherence to them and consequences for such organizations. Sanctions 
must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by organizations.86 
 
Thus in practice, the Safe Harbour imposed three requirements to ensure compliance, (a) readily 
available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms, (b) follow up procedures and (c) 
an obligation to remedy problems. More specific instructions as to how to comply with these 
requirements were found in the FAQs, which are analysed next. 
The Safe Harbour Decision included fifteen FAQs in total. Only the ones that relate to the 
redress mechanism available for individual data subject are discussed here. The most relevant 
ones were FAQ 5 (The Role of the Data Protection Authorities), FAQ 6 (Self-Certification), 
FAQ 7 (Verification) and finally FAQ 11 (Dispute Resolution and Enforcement).   
First of all, FAQ 6 that relates to self-certification. The US organisation that wished to adhere 
to the Safe Harbour Principles had to self-certify, in other words, to register with the US DoC, 
with some information about the organization which included, inter alia detail of the company’s 
privacy policy. It had to contain such information as where individuals would find information 
about the privacy policy, contact for case of complaints and requests, a statutory body that had 
jurisdiction to hear claims, potential privacy programmes that the organisation is a member of, 
method of verification and independent resource mechanism.87 Thus when the company wanted 
to register with the Safe Harbour regime it had to provide information how and where and 
individual data subject could make complaints. US organisations had the choice between dif-
ferent dispute resolution options under the Safe Harbour regime. 
FAQ 11 relating to dispute resolution and enforcement explained in more detail of the options 
that US organisations had.  FAQ 11 addresses requirement (a) and (c) of the Enforcement Prin-
ciple, thus the requirements of readily available and affordable recourse mechanisms and the 
obligation to remedy problems. To meet the second requirement (b) follow up procedures, com-
panies that wished to qualify with the Safe Harbour had to act according to FAQ 7 (Verifica-
tion), thus verify through self-assessment or outside compliance reviews. Under both of these 
options, the company ensures, either through self-assessment or an external body, that an indi-
vidual is well informed about the ways to complain and how to pursue recourse mechanisms 
and that the mechanism and procedures are effective in place.88 To satisfy requirements (a) and 
                                                          
86 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex I, Safe Habor Privacy Principles, Enforcement. 
87 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex II, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), FAQ 6. 
88 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex II, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), FAQ 7 and FAQ 11. 
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(c), recourse mechanisms and remedies there were options but the organisations were free to 
choose as long as they would meet the requirements set out in the Enforcement Principle. FAQ 
11 listed some examples of the mechanisms that companies could use to satisfy with the re-
quirements:  
 
(1) compliance with private sector developed privacy programs that incorporate the Safe Harbor 
Principles into their rules and that include effective enforcement mechanisms of the type described 
in the Enforcement Principle; 
(2) compliance with legal or regulatory supervisory authorities that provide for handling of indi-
vidual complaints and dispute resolution; or 
 (3) commitment to cooperate with data protection authorities located in the European Union or 
their authorized representatives89 
 
FAQ 11 also set out some more specific instructions: firstly individuals ought to be encouraged 
to raise complaints with the relevant organisation before relying on other recourse mechanisms. 
The dispute resolution body had to investigate all complaints unless they were completely un-
founded or frivolous. There had to be full and readily available information about the options 
the individual had if she or he wanted to file a complaint. Secondly, remedies had to reverse or 
correct the effect of non-compliance with the Principles, the organisation had to comply with 
the Principles in the future and where appropriate the future processing of the personal data of 
the individual data subject in question had to end. Sanctions had to have the effect of ensuring 
compliance with the Principles, which could mean, when appropriate, removal of the seal. 
When the dispute was heard by a private dispute resolution body, the DoC and the governmental 
body with the applicable jurisdiction had to be notified about the failure of the organisation to 
comply with the Principles. Thirdly, the Federal Trade Commission90 (hereinafter referred to 
as the FTC) would review regularly referrals from independent self-regulatory organisation. 
                                                          
89 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex II, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), FAQ 11. 
90 The FTC or the Federal Trade Commission is an independent US government body that has powers to hear 
claims and seek redress or other relief to consumers whose right have been violated under section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act. See Federal Trade Commission Act, Incorporating U.S. SAFE WEB Act amend-
ments of 2006, Sec. 5. 
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Finally, persistent failure to comply with the Principles would result that the organisation in 
question would no longer be able to participate in the Safe Harbour regime.91 
If a US organisation had chosen to comply with the European Data Protection Authorities92 
(hereinafter referred to as DPAs), FAQ 5 applied. According to FAQ 5 US organisations had 
to cooperate in matters of investigation and resolution of complaints and remedial and compen-
satory measures. In practice, cooperation happened through advice given by an informal panel 
at the European level DPA. The purpose of the advice was to ensure that Principles are followed 
and remedies are given when appropriate. The informal panel would give advice in situations 
where complaints were referred to it from the US organisation or were individuals would com-
plain to the DPA directly. The DPA would also direct individuals to make an in-house com-
plaint at the first instance. Both sides had to be heard by the DPA and there had to be an oppor-
tunity to make comments or produce evidence. In case of failure to comply with the DPA ad-
vice, the DPA could notify the FTC or another US body with powers to take enforcement action. 
Alternatively, the DPA could conclude that the agreement to cooperate with the Safe Harbour 
is null and void and notify the Department of Commerce to amend the list of participants.93    
Summa summarum, an individual data subject in the EU had choices where to seek redress 
under the Safe Harbour regime. In no particular order the first option was a direct complaint to 
the relevant US organization. Secondly, individual could complain to the self-regulatory super-
visory authority that could be located in the US or the EU, if the organization in question had 
chosen this method of dispute resolution. Examples of those would be BBBOnline and 
TRUSTe. Thirdly, complaints could be made to legal or regulatory supervisory authorities, 
again if the US organization had chosen that method. According to the Safe Harbour Decision, 
two US government bodies were able to investigate complaints and redress, the FTC and the 
Department of Transportation.94 And fourthly, if the organization had chosen the option to co-
operate with European Data Protection Authorities, a complaint could be forwarded to such a 
body. The self-regulatory supervisory authority or the DPA could also forward the matter to the 
FTC of the DoC.95 It ought to be noted that potentially there could have been other routes to 
pursue recourse, since the Safe Harbour Decision was not exhaustive in its listing of ways to 
                                                          
91 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex II, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), FAQ 11. 
92 These are national data protection authorities. There is a DPA in all EU countries. For a list of national DPAs 
see Data Protection Authorities list. 
93 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex II, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), FAQ 5. 
94 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex. 
95 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex II, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), FAQ 5 and FAQ 11. 
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ensure enforcement. These four, however, would have been the most obvious and perhaps suit-
able for an individual data subject. 
It is noteworthy that the abovementioned methods are all non-judicial. In other words the Safe 
Harbour only offered means to seek redress through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).96 
The Safe Harbour Decision was thus not clear whether court action in the US was possible. And 
even if it was possible, it would have been difficult and inconvenient also because US law took 
supremacy.97 
 
 
2.2.3. Deficiencies with Safe Harbour Redress Mechanisms 
 
Despite the options listed above seem to offer multiple options, the regime was still unsatisfac-
tory in many respects. Two major weaknesses were that it was voluntary and self-certifying.98 
Qualification with the Safe Harbour was voluntary and there were different ways to qualify. 
For instance an organization could join a self-regulatory privacy program or develop their own 
privacy policy.99 To qualify an organization had to thus comply with the Principles and publicly 
declare that it does so. Some studies also suggested that compliance with the regime was some-
what alarming.100 According to Kuner the main problems with the Safe Harbour were the lack 
of compliance with the Principles and the small number of complaints brought against it. Since 
it was difficult to assess the regime without any dispute brought in front of a judge.101 Problem 
was also the informational asymmetry, in other words, the lack of knowledge of the data sub-
jects about the data protection practices and redress options available to them.102 
At the time when the Safe Harbour was still being drafted, the Article 29 Working Party raised 
some concerns about the Enforcement principle. The relationship between Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and the Federal Trade Commission was uncertain. The dispute resolution body cho-
sen by the US organisation (self-regulatory supervisory authority, DPA or some other) had no 
                                                          
96 Alternative Dispute Resolution is any dispute settlement that happens outside the courtroom. See e.g. Legal 
Information Institute website. 
97 DiLascio, (2004), pp. 422‒423. 
98 Markel, (2006), p. 2. 
99 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex I, Safe Habor Privacy Principles, para. 3. 
100 Markel, (2006), pp. 7‒10. 
101 Kuner, (2007), p. 191. 
102 Mouzakiti, (2015), p. 43. 
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obligation to inform the FTC about breaches and there were no guarantees that the FTC would 
examine the case if an individual complained directly to the FTC.103 
Also there was a problem with the FTC enforcement. The powers of enforcement on the US 
side were referred to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. The legal authority of the FTC is questionable as regards to the enforcement 
of the Safe Harbour, because it does not match the US Supreme Court’s interpretation of Sec-
tion 5 authority.104 The 29 Working Party had also noted that certain sectors, such as telecom-
munications, transportation or employment, fell outside the scope of FTC powers.105 Only or-
ganisations that fell within the jurisdiction of the FTC could participate.106 
Remedies were another issue. According to Articles 23 and 24 of the DPD data subjects must 
be afforded compensation and the violating organisation must be sanctioned,107 but there were 
concerns that the Safe Harbour did not offer sufficient standard of redress consistent with Arti-
cle 22 and 23 the Data Protection Directive.108 The DoC had assured that remedies would be 
provided.109 The problem was that these actions had not been established in US courts.110 
The greatest flaw, however, was that these redress avenues were limited to commercial disputes 
and actions against public US bodies were not possible under the Safe Harbour. The CJEU also 
noted in the Schrems case that the Safe Harbour did not contain any means for individual data 
subjects to seek redress against the action of US public authorities.111 FTC jurisdiction also does 
not extend to other than commercial disputes.112 Similarly private dispute resolution bodies, 
such as BBBOnline or TRUSTe, do not have authority to decide on the lawfulness of US secu-
rity agencies.113 Hence, under the Safe Harbour there was not any opportunity to bring a claim 
against the actions of US public bodies. As will be seen in the next section, where I shall discuss 
                                                          
103 WP29 Opinion 4/2000, p. 7. 
104 Reidenberg, (2001-2002), p. 740‒741. 
105 WP29 Opinion 4/2000, p. 4. 
106 DiLascio, (2004), p. 415. 
107 Arts. 23 and 24, Data Protection Directive. 
108 Reidenberg, (2001-2002), p. 744‒745. 
109 Department of Commerce Memorandum. 
110 Reidenberg, (2001-2002), p. 745. 
111 Case C‑362/14, Schrems case, para. 90. 
112 ‘The Safe Harbour Decision’, Annex II, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), FAQ 11, FTC Action. And Annex 
III, Annex V and Annex VII. 
113 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Case C‑362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 
para. 206. 
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the Schrems case, Max Schrems managed to indirectly challenge the surveillance activities of 
US public authorities by bringing a case in the EU. 
 
 
2.2.4. The Schrems case and the Invalidation of the Safe Habour 
 
The famous Schrems case, which perhaps surprisingly to some managed to knock down the 
Safe Harbour, was initiated by an Austrian law student Maximillian Schrems who complained 
to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner to prevent Facebook Ireland from transferring his 
personal data to the United States.114 In this part the Schrems case will be summarized and 
analysed. In the following part I will discuss the criteria that the CJEU established in this 
Schrems case to assess Adequacy Decision. Some flaws and weaknesses of the Safe Harbour 
have already been shown above, thus here the focus will be on the CJEU decision of the 
Schrems case. 
Facebook Inc., a US company has a European subsidiary, Facebook Ireland. EU citizen wishing 
to register with Facebook need to have a contract with Facebook Ireland, allowing them to 
transfer their personal data to Facebook Inc. in the United states, where the data is processed. 115 
Max Schrems filed a complaint soon after the so called Snowden revelations because he con-
sidered that the US did not provide adequate level of data protection as it was required by EU 
law, his argument was that the revelations of Edward Snowden proved that the United States 
did not have meaningful data protection.116 The Irish Data Protection Commissioner rejected 
the complaint considering that since there was no evidence of Schrems’s personal data being 
accessed by the NSA117 and also it considered that the Commission had decided in the Safe 
Harbour Decision that the United States had adequate level of data protection, there was no 
need to investigate the matter further.118 Schrems proceeded to take the case to the Irish High 
Court that considered that despite the Data Protection Commissioner was bound by the Safe 
Harbour Decision, considering the entry into force of Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
                                                          
114 Case C‑362/14, Schrems case para. 28. 
115 Case C‑362/14, Schrems case, para. 27. 
116 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, [2013 No. 765JR], [2014], IEHC 310, para. 29. 
117 National Security Agency. A US intelligence organization. See NSA website.  
118 Case C‑362/14, Schrems case, paras. 28‒29. See also Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 
[2013 No. 765JR], [2014], IEHC 310, paras. 30‒33. 
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Rights, the application of Schrems essentially raised question of European law and the Court 
decided to refer questions to the CJEU.119  
The questions referred to the CJEU essentially asked whether the Irish Data Protection Com-
missioner was bound by the Safe Harbour Decision also having regard to Article 7, 8 and 47 of 
the Charter120 and Article 25(6) of the DPD121 and thus also preventing examination of a claim 
from an individual data subject. And alternatively whether the Data Protection Commissioner 
may conduct its own investigations of the matter.122 In the Court’s decision two particular points 
were discussed, the competence of the DPAs to assess the claim and the validity of the Safe 
Harbour decision. 
The first point does not have to be discussed in detail. What is relevant for the purposes of this 
study is that the Court decided that in the light of Article 8(1) and (3) of the Charter123 national 
authorities must be able to investigate independently whether the data transfer complies with 
EU data protection rules even if there is a Adequacy Decision by the Commission in place.124 
The court endorsed the Opinion of AG Bot, who considered that DPAs must be able to hear 
claims because of their role as guardians of human rights and also the Commission did not have 
exclusive powers to decide on the adequacy, and deprivation of investigative powers would be 
contrary to the purpose of the Data Protection Directive.125 
Secondly, the validity of the Safe Harbour Decision was being questioned. The CJEU stated 
that it was the only body that had the authority to decide on the validity of such EU act.126 The 
Court did indeed decide that the Safe Harbour Decision was invalid. It considered that the data 
protection rules of the Data Protection Directive could be easily circumvented unless the third 
country in question had ‘essentially equivalent’ level of data protection, thus moving slightly 
from the ‘adequate’ level of data protection. The Court followed the Opinion of AG Bot, who 
thought that the objective of the DPD was essentially ‘to ensure the continuity of the protection 
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afforded by that directive’.127 And, as was required by Article 25 (2) of the DPD128, all the 
circumstances governing the transfer of personal data had to be taken into account and hence 
also subsequent events that have arisen since the adoption of the Safe Harbour Decision and to 
be considered when determining the adequacy level of data protection in a third country. 129 
According to Article 25 (6) of the DPD130 the Commission must guarantee that United States 
‘ensures an adequate level of protection’…’by reason of its domestic law or of the international 
commitments’…’for the protection of the private lives and basic freedoms and rights of indi-
viduals’.  The Court considered that the Safe Harbour did not guarantee this because ‘national 
security, public interest and law enforcement requirements’ took primacy over Safe Harbour 
Principles.131 Moreover, individuals had no means of redress against interferences of that kind 
since disputes before the FTC were limited to commercial disputes.132  EU citizens also do not 
have effective right to be heard in the United States in disputes like this.133 The lack of effective 
judicial review was against Article 47 of the Charter.134 AG Bot also noted that the inability to 
bring disputes against public bodies meant that personal data is not effectively protected.135 
Furthermore the Court considered the national data protection supervisor’s ability to assess 
claims by individuals and stated that Article 28 of the DPD136 read in conjunction with the 
Article 8 of the Charter137 means that they must be able to do so. Article 3(1) of the Safe Harbour 
Decision restricted this right and the Commission had exceeded its powers when adopting that 
provision.138 The Court’s finding was, that Article 1 of the Safe Harbour Decision did not ensure 
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adequacy and also Article 3 of the Decision exceeded the powers of the Commission, and with 
those flaws, the Safe Harbour was found invalid.139  
The Safe Harbour fell short of essentially four main things. First, there was a lack of effective 
control mechanism for the self-certification regime. Second, US law prevailed, which meant 
that national security or public interest could prevail over data protection safeguards. Third, 
there were deficiencies in the Safe Harbour Decision itself. And finally, access by US authori-
ties to personal data of EU citizens violated fundamental rights.140 Bräutigam calls the decision 
‘the culmination of European uneasiness with U.S. national security law.’141 I would agree with 
this as the assessment of the Court was largely affected by mass surveillance and most probably 
the recent Snowden revelations had an influence. As regards to redress mechanism I agree with 
the Court that the Safe Harbour was unsatisfactory, especially since it did not offer any means 
of bringing claims against US public authorities. 
 
 
2.2.5. Criteria for Assessing an Adequacy Decision 
 
Hence the Safe Harbour failed because it was deemed not to ensure adequate level of data pro-
tection, inter alia because of the lack of effective redress mechanism for individual EU citizens, 
and also because the Commission had exceeded its powers. With this decision the CJEU also 
established a criteria for assessing Adequacy Decisions. Hence the Schrems case offers a tem-
plate for the assessment of Adequacy Decisions, such as the Privacy Shield. 
As discussed above, the CJEU noted in its judgement that dispute resolution before the FTC 
was limited to commercial disputes and individual data subjects had no means of recourse 
against measures of the state.142 Also the Safe Harbour Decisions did not guarantee any judicial 
or administrative means to access, rectify or erase data.143 The Court then proceeded to discuss 
the requirements of EU law relating to safeguards required for individuals to have the personal 
data sufficiently protected. The Court considered that interference with fundamental rights 
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142 Case C‑362/14, Schrems case, para. 89. 
143 Case C‑362/14, Schrems case, para. 90. 
30 
   
guaranteed by Article 7 and 8 of the Charter must be safeguarded.144 The lack of safeguards 
was against Article 47 of the Charter guaranteeing the right to effective remedy.145 
Also the Court stated that the third country in question must ensure ‘by way of its domestic law 
or its international commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights essentially equiv-
alent to that guaranteed in the EU legal order’.146 Hence an Adequacy Decision must, according 
to the decision of the CJEU in the case of Schrems, fulfil the requirement of Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and to effectively safeguard fundamental right of data protection 
(Article 8 of the Charter), because legislation that does not allow individuals to pursue remedies 
does not comply with Article 47.  
This set of criteria will be applied to the Privacy Shield in Chapter 4. More specifically I shall 
be assessing whether the Privacy Shield redress mechanisms offer 1) an independent and im-
partial tribunal previously established by law, 2) proceedings within reasonable time, 3) fair 
and public hearing, 4) effective remedy, and 5) the possibility of being advised, defended and 
represented and legal aid when applicable. 
However, it is also necessary here to look into the case law of the CJEU to some extent to 
determine how the court defines an ‘effective remedy’ of Article 47 of the Charter147 and also 
protection of personal data Article 8, because it is likely that the Court would follow its previous 
case law to determine the adequacy of the Privacy Shield. I will assess the Privacy Shield I the 
light of Article 47 in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 I shall then discuss the potential of balancing data 
protection with other interest, in particular economic interest.  
The Schrems reaffirms the right of data protection.148 In the event that the validity of the Privacy 
Shield should come before the CJEU, it is likely that the court would take into consideration its 
previous case law relating to data protection. And the court has been very protective personal 
data giving much emphasis on the Charter Articles 8 (and 7).149 For instance the CJEU has held, 
in case called Digital Rights Ireland, that in order to ensure effective protection as provided in 
Article 8 (3) of the Charter which related to control by an independent authority the Data Re-
tention Directive which did not require data to be retained with the EU was not in incompliance 
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with that Article.150 The test established in this case for the balancing between data protection 
and national security was that the access of authorities to personal data had to genuinely satisfy 
an objective genuine interest, data retention had to be limited to what was strictly necessary. 151 
Another CJEU case that might give some indication about the state of data protection in the EU 
is Google Spain, where the so called ‘right to be forgotten’ was founded.152 In the case the Court 
found that a search engine was obliged to remove personal data so that the data could not be 
found using the search engine. The notable thing about the case is, however, that the CJEU very 
specifically put data protection in front of the economic interests of the search engine.153 Some 
commentators think that this establishes a hierarchy of interests, putting data protection before 
some other interests, such as freedom of expression or the economic interests of a search engine 
operator.154 
Although the CJEU has also stated in its other judgements that data protection has to be bal-
anced against other interests, and it is not an absolute right, e.g. in cases of Schecke,155 Deutsche 
Telekom,156 and Schwartz.157 The CJEU’s reasoning does not always seem consistent. On one 
hand, the Court does recognise that the protection of personal data has to be balanced with other 
interests, while in some case the Court seems to give significant weight on data protection, as 
in the Schrems case and also in the Digital Rights Ireland case. The Court did not discuss the 
economic significance of data in its case law, other than making a vague note that national 
supervisory authorities must be able to make this balancing exercise.158  
These cases show that the CJEU is willing to give much weight and importance to data protec-
tion, even when it is compared to other interests. The Court has a quite a protectionist approach 
to data protection. It is likely that the Court would take the same approach, if it were to assess 
the Privacy Shield. The approach of the Court does not as such affect my assessment of the 
Privacy Shield redress mechanisms. Despite I am using the criteria developed by the Court, I 
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am acting on my own behalf. The Court could disagree and decide differently, if it were to make 
such a decision. Still it is good to mind the ‘high’ level of protection for personal data .  
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3. The Privacy Shield and Comparison to the Safe Harbour 
 
 
3.1. Key Points of the Privacy Shield Arrangement 
 
The European Commission adopted the Privacy Shield Decision159 on 12 of July 2016. 
Amongst other things the new framework promises better safeguards against US government 
access and easier redress for individual EU citizens. The United States gave assurances that 
access will be limited.160  The Commission and the United Sates had already agreed upon that 
it was necessary to replace the Safe Harbour with a new arrangement in February 2016.161 Dis-
cussion about strengthening the Safe Harbour had in fact already started in 2014, but the 
Schrems decision in October 2015 had accelerated the discussion significantly.162 Also the Ar-
ticle 29 Working Party had given its opinion that putting together a new framework was essen-
tial and given the Commission time until January of 2016 to complete a new regime.163 Accord-
ing to the Commission, the Privacy Shield reflects the requirements set by the CJEU in the 
Schrems ruling.164 
Most notably the United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence (White House) 
made a strong commitment ruling out mass surveillance, and also US Secretary John Kerry 
committed to establishing an independent Ombudsman to provide a redress mechanism in the 
area of national security. Also the protection of personal data of EU citizens is strengthened by 
introducing several new and also affordable dispute resolution mechanisms.165 
The Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection 
provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Privacy Shield Deci-
sion’) is similar to the Safe Harbour Decision in the sense that it also provides a system of self-
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certification.166 It is thus does not determine that United States provides adequate data protec-
tion as required by EU law, but similarly to the Safe Harbour, protection is deemed adequate if 
a US organisation is certified with the regime.167  
Similarly to the Safe Harbour, transfers of personal data from the EU to the US are only per-
mitted if the US company in question adheres to the Privacy Shield principles.168 Those are 1) 
Notice, 2) Choice, 3) Accountability for Onward Transfer, 4) Security, 5) Data Integrity and 
Purpose Limitation, 6) Access, 7) Recourse, Enforcement and Liability.169 Like with the Safe 
Harbour Decision here, it suffices to discuss the principles which relate to redress mechanisms. 
Thus according to the Recourse, Enforcement and Liability Principle, there has to be ‘robust’ 
mechanisms to ensure compliance, which in minimum must include:  
 
i. readily available independent recourse mechanisms by which each individual's com-
plaints and disputes are investigated and expeditiously resolved at no cost to the individ-
ual and by reference to the Principles, and damages awarded where the applicable law or 
private-sector initiatives so provide; 
ii. follow-up procedures for verifying that the attestations and assertions organizations make 
about their privacy practices are true and that privacy practices have been implemented 
as presented and, in particular, with regard to cases of non-compliance; and 
iii. obligations to remedy problems arising out of failure to comply with the Principles by 
organizations announcing their adherence to them and consequences for such organiza-
tions. Sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by organizations.170 
 
The Principle is similar to the Safe Harbour one, but it has been clearly stated that investigation 
of complaints must be expeditious and free. Also a follow-up procedure must pay particular 
attention to non-compliance. 
In addition to the seven Principles there is also a list of Supplemental Principles, which give 
more detailed rules how to comply with the Principles.171 They thus replace the FAQ system of 
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the Safe Harbour. Similar to the Safe Harbour, to comply with verification requirements (fol-
low-up procedures), companies can do that through self-assessment or outside compliance re-
views.172 To meet the first and third requirements, recourse mechanisms and remedies, there 
are choices. Those are same as with the Safe Harbour:  
 
(i) compliance with private sector developed privacy programs that incorporate the Privacy 
Shield Principles into their rules and that include effective enforcement mechanisms of 
the type described in the Recourse, Enforcement and Liability Principle;  
(ii) compliance with legal or regulatory supervisory authorities that provide for handling of 
individual complaints and dispute resolution; or 
(iii) commitment to cooperate with data protection authorities located in the European Union 
or their authorized representatives.173 
 
Again the list is not meant to be exhaustive, and other alternatives can be used by US organisa-
tions as long as they comply with the Principles. Different to the Safe Harbour, the Privacy 
Shield then lists specifically the recourse options available to individual data subjects. Those 
are going to be discussed in more detail in the following part. 
 
 
3.2. Comparison of Safe Harbour and Privacy Shield Redress Mechanisms 
 
In terms of redress mechanisms there have been changes in the Privacy Shield in comparison 
to the Safe Harbour. The Privacy Shield Decision has a list of redress mechanisms available for 
individual EU citizens to lodge complaints in case of non-compliance by the US bodies respon-
sible for their personal data. The decision also states that organisations must have independent 
and readily available recourse mechanism so that disputes can be resolved quickly and with no 
cost to the individual.174 Similarly to the Safe Harbour, an organisation may choose which in-
dependent recourse mechanisms it wishes to use either in the US or in the EU. Thus they are 
able to voluntarily cooperate with European national Data Protection Authorities.175  
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EU citizens can choose which route they want to pursue when lodging a complaint. Those are 
divided to redress mechanisms that are available against actions by independent companies and 
redress options that are available in case of violations by US public authorities. Redress mech-
anism against private companies are presented first. 
 
 
3.2.1. How to Complain about a Private Company 
 
The first avenue available is to lodge a complaint with the company itself. The company must 
offer a redress mechanism either inside or outside the company and inform individual data sub-
jects about how the complaint can be made. Organisations must provide information on their 
website about the Privacy Shield Principles and recourse options available with specific instruc-
tions on how to make a complaint. The complaint must be investigated and response whether 
the claim had any merits and whether it will be remedied must be given within 45 days.176 
The second option is to contact the alternative dispute resolution body if the company in ques-
tion has chosen as its independent recourse mechanism. This body may be located in the US or 
the EU. Details of this option must also be given on the website of the organisation. This body 
must investigate the claim and when appropriate provide effective remedies, which may mean 
reversing or correcting the effects of non-compliance and even termination of further data pro-
cessing. Investigation can only be denied on the basis that the claim is obviously unfounded or 
frivolous. If the company does not comply with the ruling of the alternative dispute resolution 
body, the US authorities, FTC and the Department of Commerce are notified. Failure to comply 
with these authorities will result in removal from the Privacy Shield list.177  
The third option is, if the US company has chosen to cooperate with an EU Data Protection 
Authority (DPA), the EU data subject can complain directly to the DPA. Thus this is an alter-
native to the previous option, depending which method the US organisation has chosen. Or in 
the case of human resources data in the context of an employment relationship, US companies 
are always required to comply with EU DPAs. Thus an EU citizen can always deal with the 
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local DPA, when the employment data is in question. At the DPA the claim is investigated by 
an informal panel. Both sides have an opportunity to make comments or provide evidence and 
the panel will give its advice (usually within 60 days of receiving the complaint). The US com-
pany must then comply with the advice within 25 days. If it fails to do so without a valid excuse, 
the DPA can either forward the matter to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which can start 
an enforcement action. Or, alternatively, the DPA can conclude that the breach has been serious 
and forward the matter to the Department of Commerce (DoC), which has to consider removing 
the company from the Privacy Shield list. Also the DPA, even though it has not been chosen as 
the independent recourse option by the company, can still receive complaints by EU data sub-
ject and then forward them to the FTC or the DoC. In the case that the local DPA fails to act 
the data subject can bring an action in a national court of the Member State.178 
The fourth option is to complain to the US Department of Commerce, but only through a 
DPA.179 Thus it may not be as much of another option for EU data subjects to make claims, as 
the referral to the Department of Commerce is already included in the previous option of com-
plaining to the DPA. Nevertheless the Privacy Shield Decision states in clear terms that the 
Department of Commerce will establish a dedicated point of contact and issue an update to the 
complaint within 90 days. It will also contact the violating company to facilitate resolution and 
if the company does not cooperate it can be removed from the list.180 
The fifth option is that the EU data subject can complain to the FTC directly. Complaints can 
also be referred to it by DPAs, independent dispute resolution bodies, EU Member States, or 
the Department of Commerce. The FTC will give priority to such referrals.181 Nevertheless, EU 
citizens can use the same complaint procedure that is offered to US citizens.182 The FTC pro-
vides a system for making complaints online.183 Compliance is ensured by administering con-
sent orders. The FTC can refer the matter to a court if the company fails to comply. The court 
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can order civil penalties and remedies. Alternatively, the court can impose an injunction if the 
FTC seeks it.184 
The sixth option, the last resort, is that the EU data subject may invoke arbitration at the Privacy 
Shield Panel. The arbitration will be governed by standard arbitration rules, which will be de-
termined by the Commission and the Department of Commerce. The arbitrators are be chosen 
by the parties from a pool of arbitrators nominated by the Commission and the DoC. The DPA 
will assist the EU citizen in the preparations but not the proceedings. And the proceeding may 
take place via teleconferencing, as the arbitration physically takes place in the United States. 
However, the data subject will need to pay for his or her attorney’s fees. The arbitration panel 
can impose ‘non-monetary equitable relief’ to remedy the non-compliance. This is because this 
redress option is supplementary, and the panel takes into consideration the remedies already 
awarded through other exhausted avenues of redress. Despite the panel cannot award monetary 
relief, EU citizens are free to seek such damages through US court system. In that situation 
remedies can be sought pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act. The European data 
subject has the arbitration option available in all circumstances, except when the company or 
organisation in question has committed to complying with the EU DPA, or when it is a question 
of human resources data.185 
The ‘non-monetary equitable relief’ could be, for instance, correction, deletion or returning of 
the personal data to the data subject. Costs, fees, damages or any monetary remedies are not 
available. Enforcement can be sought after the Federal Arbitration Act in US courts.186 The 
remedies offered by any of these above mentioned dispute resolution bodies ought to have the 
effect reversing or correcting the result of non-compliance. Apart from the Privacy Shield Panel 
whose powers are limited to granting ‘non-monetary equitable relief’ bodies can impose sanc-
tions which have to be rigorous to ensure compliance.187 
Still on top of these options, there are opportunities to seek remedies in US courts. Those action 
would be governed by US law that may offer remedies under torts law or breach of contract for 
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instance.188 For research economic reasons an in‒depth analysis of US law and possible reme-
dies in case of data breaches are left outside the scope of this research. It suffices here to men-
tion that the Obama administration did pass a new law, Judicial Redress Act 2015, under which 
EU citizens would have similar opportunities to sue US organisations as US citizens under US 
privacy laws.189 Instead the focus is solely on the Privacy Shield. Although it must be borne in 
mind that EU citizens might have other avenues available to them to seek recourse against non-
compliance, those options are not assessed in this thesis.  
 
 
3.2.2. How to Complain about a Public Authority 
 
The novelty of the Privacy Shield Decision is the Ombudsperson mechanism established by the 
then Secretary of State, John F. Kerry.190 Such an opportunity was lacking in the Safe Harbour 
arrangement. Under US law, EU citizens have opportunities to seek remedies against collection 
and processing of personal data by intelligence agencies.191 However these do not cover all 
possible situations and thus the Ombudsperson was established to make sure that all individual 
complaints are investigated, US law complied with and remedies awarded when needed.192 This 
option is thus not the only avenue in seeking redress against US public authorities, rather it is 
meant to be a ‘gap filling’ to overcome the limitations that exist in US law preventing EU 
citizens in bringing claims.  
Despite it is established by the US government, the Ombudsperson is independent from US 
intelligence agencies.193 He or she will report directly to the Secretary of State who must ensure 
that the Ombudsperson is not influenced by improper bodies.194 
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Complaints to the Ombudsperson can be made with the assistance of relevant supervisory au-
thorities in the data subjects’ own Member States (or the local DPA).195 The Ombudsperson 
will investigate the claim and also request for information if needed and then give a response 
whether US law has been complied with and if not, the intelligence agency in question has to 
provide remedies. The Ombudsperson will not give information whether the individual in ques-
tion has actually been a target of surveillance. Access to data held by US authorities can be 
made under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Access to records is limited in many ways.196 
Further actions for violations of law can be made to relevant Government Bodies.197 The Euro-
pean Commission is satisfied that this mechanism effectively satisfies the requirements set in 
the Schrems case.198 
 
The following chart summarises what changes the Privacy Shield has brought in comparison to 
the Safe Harbour: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
195 European Commission, Guide to the EU‒U.S. Privacy Shield, (2016), p. 20.See also, ‘The Privacy Shield Deci-
sion’, Annex 2, ANNEX III, Annex A.1. See also Preamble part. 3.1.2. para., 119. 
196 ‘The Privacy Shield Decision’, Annex 2, ANNEX III, Annex A.4. and 5. See also Preamble part. 3.1.2. paras., 
119‒121. 
197 ‘The Privacy Shield Decision’, Annex 2, ANNEX III, Annex A.6. 
198 ‘The Privacy Shield Decision’, Preamble part. 3.1.2. paras. 122‒124. 
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Safe Harbour Privacy Shield 
Redress against Pri-
vate Organisations 
  
Company Yes. Yes. 
Self-regulatory supervi-
sory authority or dispute 
resolution body (EU or 
US) 
Yes, if the US organisation had 
chosen this method. 
Yes, if the US organisation 
has chosen this method. 
European Data Protec-
tion Authority (DPA) 
Yes, if the US organisation had 
chosen this method. 
Yes, if the US organisation 
has chosen this method. Al-
ways, when employment data 
is in question. 
Department of Com-
merce (DoC) 
Disputes could be forwarded 
from the DPA or the self-regu-
latory supervisory body. 
Only through a DPA. 
(Through a dispute resolution 
body if the US company fails 
to comply with the judgement 
of that body.) 
Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) 
Yes, if the US organisation had 
chosen this method. Disputes 
could be forwarded from the 
DPA or the self-regulatory su-
pervisory body. 
Yes. Disputes can also be for-
warded from the DPA, dispute 
resolution body, DoC or EU 
Member States. 
Privacy Shield Panel N/A Yes, as last resort. 
US Courts Unclear whether possible. Yes. But subject to limitations 
of US law. 
Redress against Public 
Organisations 
  
Ombudsperson N/A Yes. 
US Courts N/A Subject to limitations of US 
law. 
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4. Assessment of the Privacy Shield  
 
 
4.1. Assessment of the Privacy Shield in Light of the Schrems Criteria 
 
Now that I have explained how the Privacy Shield works and in particular what redress mech-
anism are available under this regime, I will assess it using the criteria established by the CJEU 
in the case of Schrems. The set of criteria is, as was discussed above in Chapter 2, that an 
Adequacy Decision must fulfil the requirement set in Article 47 of the Charter199 to effectively 
safeguard the fundamental right of data protection (Article 8200) as well as individual privacy 
(Article 7)201. Individuals must be able to seek effective remedies through a tribunal that is 
independent, impartial and previously established by law.202 
The CJEU held in the Schrems that ‘the third country concerned in fact ensures, by reason of 
its domestic law or its international commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights 
essentially equivalent to that guaranteed in the EU legal order.’203 Hence the Court has decided 
that the United States does not offer effective data protection, i.e. it is incompatible with the 
Charter.204 It also means that the level of protection guaranteed by the Charter must be essen-
tially equivalent, even when data is transferred to the US.  
However, Article 47 has a very close connection with Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)205. Thus I will also use the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereinafter referred to as ECtHR). I shall assess all the redress mechanisms offered by 
the Privacy Shield in the light of this set of criteria one by one. Because the redress mechanisms 
are different for claims against private actors and public ones, I will discuss them separately, 
starting with the redress mechanisms that are offered against actions by private organisations. 
Then I will also assess the regime as a whole, in order to determine whether the Privacy Shield 
redress mechanism system is too complicated. 
 
                                                          
199 Art. 47, Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
200 Art. 8, Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
201 Art. 7, Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
202 Ustaran, Pt. 2, (2016), p. 4. 
203 C‑362/14, Schrems case, paras. 73, 96. 
204 NiLoidean, (2016), p. 4. 
205 Art. 6, European Convention on Human Rights. 
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4.1.1. Redress Mechanisms Against Private Companies 
 
Firstly, an option is to complain to the company itself. This option obviously does not fulfil the 
requirement of ‘an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law’ as re-
quired by Article 47(2) of the Charter. However, for effectiveness’ sake, it is good that data 
subjects have the option of dealing with the company itself in the first place. The dispute could 
potentially be dissolved without even referring to an outside tribunal, and time and resources 
could thus be saved. The timeframe of 45 days that is given to organizations to respond to 
complaints seems reasonable206 enough, if it leads to a satisfying result for the data subject. The 
effectiveness of this route is also dependent on how well do organizations provide information 
about the availability and the process of making complaints. It is also notable (with all of the 
redress options) that data subject must have access to their data, to have knowledge about a 
potential breach in the first place.  
Secondly, one can refer the complaint to the independent dispute resolution body that the com-
pany has chosen. According to CJEU case law, the tribunal that is required in Article 47(2)207 
does not have to be a so called traditional court. The case law of the ECtHR also says the 
same.208 The CJEU has stated that the tribunal must be established by law, permanent, have 
compulsory jurisdiction, have inter partes procedure, applies rules of law and is independent.209 
In that case an independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) body could suffice to satisfy 
the requirement of Article 47(2), provided that it satisfies the aforementioned requirements. 
The tribunal must be independent and impartial. According to the case law of the CJEU, to be 
independent the tribunal must be acting as a third party, hence not linked to any of the parties 
in dispute.210 Impartiality rather relates to the neutrality of the individual decision makers and 
CJEU has stated that the members of the tribunal must be impartial.211 Potentially it could be 
questioned how independent the ADR body chosen by the company itself could be, because the 
                                                          
206 The CJEU has not established any exact timeframe for proceedings but generally they have to be reasonable. 
See Case C‑58/12 P, Groupe Gascogne SA v European Commission, paras. 82‒88. 
207 Art. 47(2), Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
208 ECtHR, Klass and others v Germany, No. 5029/71, 6 September 1978, paras. 56 and 67. 
209 Case C-54/96, Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH, para. 23.  
210 Case C-24/92, Pierre Corbiau v Administration des contributions, para 15. See also Case C-506/04, Graham J. 
Wilson v Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, para 49.  
211 Case C-506/04, Graham J. Wilson v Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, para 53. 
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usual practice in the industry of commercial arbitration is that, the both parties to the dispute 
choose their arbitrators.212 Same rule applies to mediation.213  
The Privacy Shield Decision does not specify any time frame for the dispute resolution body 
chosen by the company to complete the dispute resolution procedures, so I cannot say whether 
it would be reasonable as required in the case law of the CJEU.214 The fact that there is not any 
timeframe raises a question whether it was intended by the drafters of the Privacy Shield Deci-
sion. In any case the lack of timeframe is regrettable and can be seen as a weakness. 
Article 47(2) of the Charter also requires fair and public hearing.215 Fair and public hearing 
means in the context of EU law that there has to be equality of arms, adversarial proceedings, 
reasoned decision and judicial execution.216 The first, equality of arms, relates to the parties’ 
equal opportunity to present their case. According to the CJEU both parties must be given a 
reasonable opportunity to present their case.217 Adversarial proceedings on the other hand mean 
that the parties must be able to examine all documents and comment on them.218 Reasoned 
opinion means that the defendant must be able to understand why the decision was made against 
him or her so that an appeal can be made.219 The latter, judicial execution means that there has 
to be an opportunity to seek enforcement in courts. In the context of EU law, public hearing 
means the right to an oral hearing in person, although that right is not absolute.220 Hence an 
independent body can be considered satisfactory from the EU law perspective as long as it 
satisfies these requirements. So to conclude whether the requirement of fair and public hearing 
is satisfied, I must say yes, as long as it is consistent with the requirements mentioned above. 
The Privacy Shield Decision does not specify what the rules of this option are, so it depends.  
Article 47(1)221 also entails that there has to be an effective remedy. According to the Privacy 
Shield Decisions Enforcement, Recourse and Liability Principle US organisations must remedy 
problems that arise as a result from the failure to comply with the Privacy Shield.222 According 
                                                          
212 Born, (2014), p. 1637. 
213 Hopt and Steffek, (2013), p. 56. 
214 Case C‑58/12 P, Groupe Gascogne SA v European Commission, paras. 82‒88. 
215 Art. 47(2), Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
216 Handbook on European law relating to access to justice, (2016), p. 40. 
217 Case C‑199/11, Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, para. 71. 
218 Case C‑300/11, ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department, para. 55. 
219 Case C‑619/10, Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd, para 53. 
220 Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, para. 49. 
221 Art. 47(1), Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
222 ‘The Privacy Shield Decision’, Annex 2, ANNEX II, II. Principles, 7.a.iii. 
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to the Privacy Shield Decision this ADR body chosen by the company must be able to afford 
remedies, such as reversing or correcting the damages suffered or in some situations terminating 
the data processing altogether.223 In the case law of the CJEU an effective remedy depends on 
the circumstances, and the situation must be assessed as a whole.224 EU law does not require 
the use of specific remedies, rather, it only sets some standards for remedies and leaves it to the 
discretion of Member States to decide what exact remedies they want to use. The CJEU has 
stated that the principle of effectiveness and equivalence must be observed.225 These relate to 
the obligation of Member States to ensure the effectiveness of EU law with remedies. Similarly 
the effectiveness of EU law could be hampered if actors in third countries would not be required 
to afford effective remedies. In my opinion reversing or correcting the damage seems satisfac-
tory. However, I wonder under what circumstances the processing could be terminated alto-
gether. The Privacy Shield Decision does not specify under which condition it could occur, 
rather, it only says ‘depending on the circumstances’.226 
Yet one might question the extent and reach of EU law. The CJEU has set some limitations to 
ensure the effectiveness of EU law, thus limiting the discretion of Member States. Hence ac-
tions by the Member States that render the EU law ineffective are not allowed.227 The question 
is whether the same rules would apply to an ADR body that is based in the United States. Or, 
in other words, would that US based ADR body have to comply with CJEU case law and what 
constitutes and effective remedy. Taking into consideration the Schrems case and how the Court 
considered that the data protection must be ‘essentially equivalent’228 I would conclude by way 
of analogy, that the US based ADR body would have to comply with the CJEU case laws as 
regards to what constitutes an effective remedy. The Court noted in its judgement that the level 
of data protection required could be easily circumvented if the protection in the third country 
                                                          
223 ‘The Privacy Shield Decision’, Annex 2, ANNEX II, III. Supplemental Principles, 11.e. See also Preamble part. 
2.3., paras. 45‒47. 
224 Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v Belgian State, para. 14. 
225 Case C‑583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European Un-
ion, para. 102. ‘Equivalence’ in the context of EU law means that the national procedural rules that safeguard 
rights under EU law must not be less favourable than in equivalent domestic situations. ‘Effectiveness’ on the 
other hand requires that domestic rules must not render the exercise of EU rights difficult of excessively diffi-
cult. See Joined Cases C‑317/08, C‑318/08, C‑319/08 and C‑320/08 Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA (C-
317/08), Filomena Califano v Wind SpA (C-318/08), Lucia Anna Giorgia Iacono v Telecom Italia SpA (C-319/08) 
and Multi-service Srl v Telecom Italia SpA (C-320/08), para  48. 
226 ‘The Privacy Shield Decision’, Preamble part. 2.3., para. 45. 
227 Case C-213/89, The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others, para. 20. 
See also: Case C-106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA, paras. 22‒23. 
228Case C‑362/14, Schrems case, para. 73. 
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was not essentially equivalent. And the purpose of Article 25(6) of the Data Protection Directive 
is to ensure that the protection accorded in Article 8(1) of the Charter is that the high level of 
protection continues even when data is transferred to a third country.229 The same would be true 
with all the other elements of Article 47 of the Charter. Whether one thinks that the EU is 
reaching its claws too far outside its jurisdiction is another matter. But for the purposes of pro-
tecting EU citizens’ fundamental right of data protection it is arguably necessary.  
Based on what has been discussed above it can be concluded that as long as the ADR body 
satisfies the requirements that have been set by the CJEU as regards to Article 47, it can be 
considered satisfactory. Also according to the Privacy Shield, the matter can be referred to the 
FTC or the Department of Commerce in the case that the US organisation fails to comply with 
the decision of the ADR body. I shall discuss these in detail below. 
Article 47(2) of the Charter requires also that everyone must have ‘the possibility of being 
advised, defended and represented’ and legal aid has to be available where appropriate (Art. 
47(3)).230 The Privacy Shield only requires that the US company in question, as well as the 
ADR body chosen by the company, must provide information about the complaint proce-
dures.231 Although anyone could hire a legal assistant to navigate the terms and conditions of 
making a complaint, there is at least a slight chance of this mechanism not meeting the require-
ment of article 47, because it depends on how understandable and reader friendly the infor-
mation is. 
Potential problems could arise in filing an eligible complaint, especially if the chosen ADR 
body happens to be located in the US. For instance, TRUSTe, a US based establishment, which 
provides dispute resolution in data protection matters, requires a complaint made in English, or 
the relevant organisation which the data subject wishes to complain about must provide trans-
lation.232 (That can be difficult if the relevant organisation is based in the US.) The geographical 
location might also be an issue. According to the CJEU the distant location of the court may be 
an obstacle in bringing proceedings.233 The CJEU has also stated that mere electronic access is 
                                                          
229 Case C‑362/14, Schrems case, paras. 72‒73. 
230 Art. 47(2) and (3), Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
231 ‘The Privacy Shield Decision’, Annex 2, ANNEX II, III. Supplemental Principles, 11.d.ii. See also Preamble part. 
2.3., paras. 43 and 45. 
232 TURSTe website, TRUSTe Privacy Dispute Resolution FAQs. See also the online Dispute Resolution form in 
TRUSTe Feedback and Resolution System. 
233 Case C‑567/13, Nóra Baczó and János István Vizsnyiczai v Raiffeisen Bank Zrt, para 56. 
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not satisfactory as it may be impossible or excessively difficult for some people.234 Although 
this last argument may have weakened as the digitalisation has progressed. Hence the fact that 
the ADR body is located in the United States (or even in another EU Member State may be 
equally difficult to access) might not satisfy Article 47 of the Charter. Fortunately there are 
national DPAs in EU Member States, potentially able to give legal assistance. DPAs shall be 
discussed below. 
One detail that also caught my attention was that the dispute resolution body can deny the in-
vestigation of the claim if it is ‘obviously unfounded or frivolous.’235 The Irish Data Protection 
Commissioner rejected the claim of Max Schrems on the basis that is was ‘frivolous and vexa-
tious.’236 Whether the choice of wording in the Privacy Shield is an accidental coincidence is 
hard to tell. However one could wonder what sort of claims could be rejected on the basis that 
they are ‘frivolous’. Potentially even ones that might have the effect of even knocking down 
the entire Adequacy Decision? 
Thirdly, there is an option of starting procedures through the EU Data Protection Authority 
(DPA). This option is available when the US organisation has chosen to cooperate with the 
European DPA or when it is a matter of employee data. In other circumstances EU data subjects 
can still approach the DPA, but then it can only refer the case to the FTC or the Department of 
Commerce.237 Hence the national DPA cannot be helpful with the communication either to the 
US company itself or the chosen ADR body, except in employment data matters and when the 
company has subjected itself to the oversight of the DPA. The Privacy Shield Decision does 
not specify whether the DPA can help with mere communication with the US company. There-
fore the CJEU might think that dealing with an ADR body located in the US might be ‘exces-
sively difficult’.238 
Nevertheless, in matters that the DPA has powers, I must assess whether it meets the require-
ments set in Article 47 of the Charter. Under this redress avenue there is an informal panel 
established by the local DPA that can investigate the claim and then give advice to the US 
company and if the latter fails to comply with the advice, the matter can be referred to the FTC 
                                                          
234 Joined Cases C‑317/08, C‑318/08, C‑319/08 and C‑320/08 Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA (C-317/08), 
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235 ‘The Privacy Shield Decision’, Preamble part. 2.3., para. 45. 
236 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, [2013 No. 765JR], [2014], IEHC 310, paras. 30‒33. 
237 ‘The Privacy Shield Decision’, Preamble part. 2.3., paras. 48 and 51. 
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or the Department of Commerce.239 I have already discussed above that according to CJEU case 
law the tribunal required by Article 47(2) of the Charter does not have to be a court, but it has 
to be established by law, be permanent, have compulsory jurisdiction, have inter partes proce-
dure, applies rules of law and is independent.240 At first glance an ‘informal panel’ does not 
sound to fulfil these requirements, but potentially one ought to rather assess the DPA and 
whether it fulfils these requirements. The ‘informal panel’ can be considered a working group 
within the larger organisation responsible for carrying out the functions of the DPA.  
Article 47(2) of the Charter also requires the trial to be completed within reasonable time.241 In 
the case law of the CJEU reasonable time is dependent on the circumstances.242 The time frame 
of 60 days to give its advice and then allowing 25 days for the US company to comply with it 
seems reasonable in my opinion. However, one must also note that the data subject might have 
already waited 45 days to get a response from the company itself. 
As already stated above, fair and public hearing means in the context of EU law equality of 
arms, adversarial proceedings, reasoned decision and judicial execution. Equality of arms 
seems to be fulfilled as each party must be given opportunity to comment or provide evi-
dence.243 From the Privacy Shield Decision itself it cannot be said with certainty whether the 
requirement of adversarial proceedings is fulfilled. It only states that the rules of procedure are 
established at the particular DPA.244 Whether the panel gives a reasoned decision is also am-
biguous. In the first place it gives advice to the relevant US organisation and only if the latter 
fails to comply, the panel will conclude that there has been a breach in cooperation and forward 
the case to the Department of Commerce or refer the matter to the FTC.245 The Privacy Shield 
Decision does not indicate whether the panel is obliged to give a reasoned opinion. Perhaps it 
is also a matter of internal rules of procedure. Lastly the requirement of judicial execution seems 
to be satisfied at least in the case that the panel fails to act, because the data subject can turn to 
national courts.246 However, then there would be an opportunity to remedy the failure of the 
DPA panel to act rather that the data breach. And when the case is referred to the FTC or the 
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49 
   
DoC, the execution becomes dependent on US law and it is questionable whether EU funda-
mental rights can be enforced there. I shall discuss these two bodies in more detail below. 
The question of an effective remedy that is required by Article 47(1) of the Charter is also 
somewhat questionable under this redress route. The Privacy Shield Decision does not specify 
whether the DPA panel is actually able to afford any remedies. As discussed above, EU law 
does not require the use of any specific remedies, but only that the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness have to be complied with.247 It is difficult to say whether the advice given by 
the panel and the compliance of the US organisation with that advice can constitute an effective 
remedy. I would suggest that it would as long as it has the effect of correcting or reversing 248 
the effects of non-compliance with the Privacy Shield principles. Although, the DPA may in 
some situations order the suspension of the data transfer.249 This would have the effects of pre-
venting future damage, but not remedying the effects of non-compliance that have already oc-
curred. 
Yet Article 47(2) of the Charter also requires that everyone must have an opportunity to be 
advised, defended and represented and also Article 47(3) requires legal aid when applicable. 
The Privacy Shield Decision does not specify whether these options are available. Potentially 
dealing with a local DPA will be easier in practice than dealing with a US based ADR body for 
instance. However, the help of the DPA is somewhat limited, as discussed above. 
Fourthly, one can complain to the Department of Commerce (DoC). This can only be done 
through a DPA. I have already discussed above with regards to the DPAs and alternative dispute 
resolution bodies what the requirements are for in independent and impartial tribunal that is 
previously established by law as required by Article 47(2) of the Charter.250 The DoC does not 
have an inter partes procedure, so for that reason it is questionable whether it could satisfy the 
requirements that the CJEU has set for tribunals.251 Also the independence of the body could 
be questioned, because the DoC is part of the US government.252  
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With regards to the reasonable time requirement in Article 47(2) of the Charter the Privacy 
Shield Decision states that the Department of Commerce will provide an update about the status 
of the case within 90 days of receiving the referral.253 As the CJEU has not established any 
exact time frame I cannot say for certainty whether this is reasonable, but I would argue that it 
would be somewhat frustrating to have to wait for three months and then receive a response 
that they are working on it. It must also be remembered that the data subject might have already 
exhausted other redress options before turning to the DoC. 
It is questionable whether the requirement of fair and public hearing that is required in Article 
47(2) of the Charter254 is satisfied. First of all, it is not clear whether there is equality of arms 
or adversarial proceedings once the case is referred to the DoC. The EU data subject can obvi-
ously present his or her case to the local DPA, but the Privacy Shield Decision does not specify 
whether there should be any contact on part of the DoC to the data subject or whether there is 
an opportunity to present evidence. Nor is there any mention whether the DoC will give a rea-
soned decision. Instead, once the DoC has received a complaint from the data subject through 
the DPA, it can only choose to remove the US organisation from the Privacy Shield list, but it 
cannot do anything else.255 
Also with regards to effective remedy that is required by Article 47(1) of the Charter256, the 
powers of the DoC are limited to removing organisations from the Privacy Shield list. When 
the DoC sees that there has been a persistent failure to comply, the US organisation can be 
removed from the Privacy Shield list.257 Persistent failure to comply occurs if the US organisa-
tion ‘refuses to comply with a final determination by any privacy self-regulatory, independent 
dispute resolution, or government body, or where such a body determines that an organization 
frequently fails to comply with the Principles to the point where its claim to comply is no longer 
credible’.258 There is not any mention of any remedies that the DoC could afford to the data 
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subject. Only that it will make its best efforts to find a resolution.259 Although it is not impos-
sible that the resolution or the removal from the list may have the effect of correcting or revers-
ing the effects of con-compliance, I find that the remedies ought to be more clearly stated.  
The positive part is that the EU data subject can deal with the local DPA, which will be helpful 
in terms of logistical and linguistic problems. Potentially the DPA will be able to provide some 
sort of assistance. Also the DoC will have a specified point of contact and make their best 
efforts.260 
Fifthly, it is possible to complain to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). I have already dis-
cussed above what are the requirement of independence and impartially in EU law as well as 
what are the requirements for a tribunal. This body has the same problem as the DoC, it does 
not have inter partes procedure.261 
The Privacy Shield Decision does not specify a timeframe for the FTC option, so it cannot be 
said with certainty if this option would satisfy the requirement of ‘reasonable time’ as required 
in Article 47(2) of the Charter. Here it must also be noted that the data subject could have 
already sought redress through the company, the independent dispute resolution body or the 
DPA. Thus considerable time could have already passed before even turning to the FTC. 
From the Privacy Shield document it cannot be concluded whether the requirements of fair and 
public hearing of Article 47(2) of the Charter would be satisfied. The resources of the body are 
seriously limited, privacy issues being only a tiny portion of all the issues it deals with. The 
Privacy Division of the FTC does not have the means to remedy data breaches or investigate 
complaints throughout so that both sides can be taken into consideration.262 At least judicial 
execution can be sought from US courts on behalf of the FTC.263 
Article 47(1) of the Charter264 requires effective remedies. FTC’s powers of granting remedies 
are limited to some extent. First of all, it can only grant remedies when there is actual harm or 
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substantial injury. And any changes to this approach are unlikely because of the political econ-
omy of the organisation itself, which prevents a departure from the harm-based approach.265 
Personal data breaches can be complicated and it can sometimes be difficult to show any actual 
harm. The FTC can order administrative orders, thus requiring the US organisation to cease the 
data processing. In the case that the organisation fails to comply with this order, the FTC can 
order civil penalties or refer the case to US courts. The FTC thus cannot provide monetary 
remedies but they have to be sought through US courts. In addition the FTC can only act if 
there has been a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.266 I have already discussed the limits of 
the powers of the FTC with regards to the Safe Harbour. Some notable fields are excluded from 
its jurisdiction, such as telecommunications, transportation and employment.267 
From this I would conclude that the remedial powers of the FTC do not seem satisfactory from 
the European perspective. The mere ceasing of data processing does not have the effect of re-
versing or correcting the effects of non-compliance and any actual remedies can only be sought 
through US courts, which adds another hurdle to the process, complicating it even further. Even 
the sanction that the FTC is able to give to the US company in breach are small.268 
Sixthly, the ‘last resort’ of dispute resolution with private companies is the Privacy Shield 
Panel, an arbitral panel, which EU data subject can refer to if everything else fails. Despite the 
fact that they could still refer to US courts even after exhausting this avenue.269 However since 
this thesis is focused on the redress mechanism offered by the Privacy Shield, I have left a 
detailed analysis of the US court system outside the scope. This arbitration option is only to be 
used for residual claims, thus if the violation of the Privacy Shield Principles has not been 
remedied, or it has been remedied only partially.270 
As I have stated above, an arbitration panel would be sufficient for a ‘tribunal’ required by 
Article 47(2). Also the Department of Commerce and the Commission designate a pool of ar-
bitrator based on their integrity, independence and competence in data protection law. They 
also have to be independent from any influence of any body.271  On paper it seems that the 
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Privacy Shield Decision requires independence and impartiality of the arbitration panel, which 
is good. 
According to the Privacy Shield Decision, the arbitration process has to be completed within 
90 days of issuing the proceedings unless the parties agree otherwise.272 As discussed above the 
CJEU requires reasonable time which is dependent on the circumstances. In my view 90 days 
seems a reasonable time for arbitration procedures. However it must also be borne in mind that 
to get to this stage the EU data subject might have already had to complain to the company 
itself, then proceed to an independent ADR body or the DPA (whichever applicable), the De-
partment of Commerce and the FTC. A considerable time would likely to have passed before 
being able to come before the arbitration panel.  
With regards fair and public hearing required by Article 47(2) of the Charter273, the Panel is 
meant to use well-established arbitration procedures. The Privacy Shield Decision mentions for 
instance AAA (American Arbitration Association) and JAMS (Judicial Arbitration and Media-
tion Services).274 I will not go into detail with the rules these organisations use, but generally 
the arbitration procedures could satisfy the requirements of equality of arms, adversarial pro-
ceedings, reasoned decision and judicial execution. 
About the remedies that the Privacy Shield Panel is able to award, the ‘non-monetary equitable 
relief’ could be considered satisfactory from the perspective of CJEU case law. As discussed 
above the remedy ought to be effective but the law does not require the use of specific reme-
dies.275 Such non-monetary relief as correction, deletion or returning of the personal data to the 
data subject could be satisfactory. Also since this redress option is only mean to be supplemen-
tary, I would conclude that it is satisfactory. However, in a situation where the data subject 
would have exhausted all the other redress options and not received any monetary relief, it could 
be disappointing that to receive any monetary damages one would still have to continue to US 
courts and then be limited by FTCs jurisdiction. Although, since EU legislation does not require 
the use of any specific remedies, it is unlikely that the lack of monetary relief would be an 
obstacle to the enjoyment of the rights under Article 47. 
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4.1.2. Redress Mechanisms Against US Public Authorities  
 
The Privacy Shield has an option to seek redress against the actions of US public authorities 
through the Ombudsperson mechanism. This option was completely lacking under the Safe 
Harbour regime. I have already mentioned that there may be some opportunities to seek redress 
under US law, but I have left these outside the scope of this study and instead I shall only focus 
on this Ombudsperson option, because it was meant to ‘fill the gaps’ and limitations in US 
law.276 
First of all, it is questionable whether an Ombudsperson could be considered an ‘independent 
and impartial tribunal previously established by law’ as required by Article 47(2) of the Charter 
and Article 6(1) of the ECHR.277 Despite the Privacy Shield assures that the Ombudsperson is 
independent form the Intelligence Community, it is still a body established under the US gov-
ernment.278 Researchers at the European Parliament have also raised their concerns for this, that 
the Ombudsperson is not consistent with Article 47 of the Charter.279 The WP29 also has the 
same concern and they also question whether the Ombudsperson is even a tribunal as required 
by Article 47(2) of the Charter. The tribunal does not have to be a traditional court according 
to ECtHR case law.280 The tribunal has to be independent.281  
The independence of the Ombudsperson has been questioned inter alia because he or she would 
have not full powers to address complaints and could not even tell the data subject whether he 
or she has been targeted by surveillance activities.282 WP29 also suspects that the Ombudsper-
son does not have sufficient investigatory powers.283 The Privacy Shield Decision only states 
that Ombudsperson will cooperate with Government bodies and independent oversight bodies, 
to which I referred to above, and that the Ombudsperson will have all the information necessary 
to give a response to the EU data subject.284 It is thus not clear whether the Ombudsperson will 
have access to all relevant information to conduct a full investigation. In the case law of the 
CJEU independence means that the tribunal must act as a third party, thus independent from 
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the parties and also administrative authorities.285 As regards to impartiality on the other hand, 
the tribunal must be both subjectively and objectively impartial. The first means that the mem-
bers of the tribunal must not be biased or prejudiced personally, and the latter, that there suffi-
cient guarantees to exclude legitimate doubts.286 Assessing the Privacy Shield Decision solely 
it is impossible to give any definite conclusions about the independence and impartiality, but 
considering the limited investigatory powers, the independence could be doubted.  
Whether the Ombudsperson is a tribunal, is also questionable. I have already discussed above 
what are the requirements for a tribunal in the case law of the CJEU.287 From these requirements 
at least the requirement of inter partes procedure does not seem to be fulfilled, because despite 
the Ombudsperson will communicate with the individual through the responsible complaint 
handling body (which could be the DPA), the parties are not included in the investigation.288   
Secondly, considering the time of the proceedings under the Ombudsperson mechanism, the 
Privacy Shield states, that a response will be given ‘in a timely manner’.289 This vague expres-
sion is not very helpful in determining whether this is reasonable as required in EU law.290 
According to ECtHR case law it depends on the circumstances whether it is reasonable.291 The 
entire length of the proceeding starting from the initiation to the appellate procedures have to 
be included in the consideration to determine whether the time is consistent with Article 6.1 of 
the ECHR.292 Similarly the case law of the CJEU requires reasonable time.293 In the absence of 
information of the exact length of the proceeding within the Ombudsperson mechanism it is 
impossible to say whether it is reasonable. However, the ECtHR has established that such issues 
as ‘the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities and 
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what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute’294 must be considered. Potentially the fact 
that in the context of the Ombudsperson the question could be a matter of national security 
could mean that the issue is considered complex. It is difficult to confirm this. 
Fair and public hearing is also required by Article 47(2) of the Charter.295 First, it is not clear 
whether equality of arms is satisfied. The EU complaint handling body will help in making the 
complaint and if the Ombudsperson needs additional information he or she will contact the EU 
data subject or the body.296 Hence, the EU data subject will have some opportunity to present 
his or her case. However, the Ombudsperson mechanism does not have adversarial proceedings. 
In the case law of the ECtHR it is required that the parties must have an opportunity to examine 
and comment the evidence and submissions made by the other party.297 CJEU case law has the 
same requirement.298 Apart from the potential further questions that the Ombudsperson may 
present to the data subject (or the handling body), the Privacy Shield decision does not require 
the parties to be able to make comments.  The EU data subject will thus not have the opportunity 
to respond to any claims that the US organisation in question may have put forward. This will 
make it very difficult to make a claim as it will be impossible to anticipate all the potential 
arguments that may be made during proceedings.  
Reasoned decision is also required.299 The Privacy Shield decision only states that the Ombud-
sperson will confirm that the issue has been investigated, US law has been complied with and 
that when appropriate, remedies have been awarded. The Ombudsperson will not tell if the data 
subject has been a target of surveillance.300  It seems that the requirement of reasoned opinion 
is not satisfied. The lack of sufficient information would make it very difficult to appeal, as is 
required in the case law of the CJEU301 and the ECtHR.302 The CJEU has stated that the reasons 
                                                          
294 ECtHR, Frydlender v. France, No. 30979/96, 27 June 2000, para. 43. 
295 Art 47(2), Charter of Fundamental Rights. And Art. 6(1), European Convention of Human Rights. I have al-
ready stated above that fair and public hearing means be equality of arms, adversarial proceedings, reasoned 
decision and judicial execution. 
296 ‘The Privacy Shield Decision’, Annex 2, Annex III, Annex A, 3. and 4.b‒c, f.  
297 ECtHR, Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, No. 12952/87, 23 June 1993, para. 63. 
298 Case C‑199/11, Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, para. 71. 
299 For ECtHR See ECtHR, Suominen v. Finland, No. 37801/97, 24 July 2003, paras. 36‒38. And CJEU, Case 
C‑619/10, Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico In-vestments Ltd, para 53. 
300 ‘The Privacy Shield Decision’, Annex 2, Annex III, Annex A, 4.e. See also Preamble para. 121. 
301 Case C‑619/10, Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd, para 53. 
302 ECtHR, Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, No. 12945/87, 16 December 1992, para 53. See also Joined Cases 
C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi, para. 100. 
57 
   
must be ‘specific and concrete’.303 Then finally, there has to be judicial execution. The Privacy 
Shield Decision does not offer this option, but further actions are referred to the relevant US 
Government body or independent oversight bodies.304 Should the EU data subject wish to have 
access to US Government records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and denied, 
appeal can be made first through administrative means and then in federal courts.305 Judicial 
execution as such is missing. The WP29 has also understood that the decision of the Ombud-
sperson is final and judicial execution or appeal is not possible.306  
Article 47(1) of the Charter307 also says that there has to be an effective remedy. The same is 
also required in Article 13 of the ECHR.308 According to the case law of the CJEU the effec-
tiveness of the remedy depends on the circumstances.309 The remedy must also be effective and 
equivalent.310 The Privacy Shield Decision does not specify what the remedies will be in the 
case of a public authority violating data protection rules. According to the Supplemental Prin-
ciples the remedy must have the effect of reversing or correcting the non-compliance. But this 
seems to only apply to remedies awarded by dispute resolution bodies with dispute with private 
companies.311 With the information given in the Privacy Shield Decision it is thus impossible 
to say whether the remedies awarded to EU data subjects in case of non-compliance by a public 
authority would be effective as required by EU law. Also, considering that the Ombudsperson 
shall not confirm whether the EU data subject has in fact been a target or surveillance, makes 
it impossible to assess whether the remedy is effective.  
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Article 47(2) does still require the right of being advised, defended or represented and Article 
47(3) require legal aid when appropriate.312 Considering that the ‘EU individual complaint han-
dling body’ (the DPA) shall be assisting the EU data subject with the submission of the com-
plaint313 this requirement could be satisfied.  
One must note, however, that some other options could be possible for EU citizens to seek 
redress against the US intelligence agencies. One might do what Max Schrems did and bring 
an action at the Data Protection Authority, which can suspend the data transfer or refer the case 
to the national courts. The national court could then further the case to the CJEU, which could 
then invalidate the Privacy Shield.314 In my view this option seems tiresome and time consum-
ing. It is also a very long road to seek redress. As mentioned above, an individual could go 
directly to other US Government bodies. In that instance the relevant Act would be Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), which is limited and likely to result in an unsatisfactory result for the 
EU data subject. In this case referring to US courts would be the only solution, where an action 
could be brought under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or some other piece of US legis-
lation.315  
In my opinion, the Ombudsperson Mechanism is certainly an improvement. After all it does 
introduce a redress mechanism that was completely lacking in the Safe Harbour Decision. Yet, 
the new mechanism also raises many questions. The Ombudsperson is meant to investigate 
whether US law has been complied with, not whether the organisation has complied with the 
Privacy Shield Principles. This raises the question whether rules are different for public bodies 
than private ones. And I have already discussed that US data protection law is fundamentally 
different from EU data protection law, it is sector specific and piecemeal. And the CJEU in the 
Schrems ruling specifically states than an Adequacy Decision would have to satisfy the require-
ments of Article 8 of the Charter316 and thus provide effective data protection like guaranteed 
in that provision. From the Privacy Shield Decision one cannot confidently confirm that such 
protection is guaranteed. According to the Commission the new arrangement does satisfy the 
requirements set by the CJEU, because there are a number of new opportunities to seek re-
dress.317 I would not quite agree. 
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From these considerations I must conclude that with regards to the Ombudsperson mechanism 
seems that EU citizens are at the mercy of US law. It is doubtful that EU data subjects can 
enforce their fundamental right of data protection on the other side of the Atlantic. Nor is this 
option in line with the requirements set in Article 47 of the Charter. 
 
 
4.1.3. Overall Assessment of the Privacy Shield Mechanisms 
 
The Privacy Shield has introduced many new innovations in terms of redress mechanism, which 
can certainly be seen as a positive thing, because many options were lacking under the Safe 
Harbour. In the field there are mixed opinions about the new redress mechanisms. Some think 
that the addition of all new redress mechanisms and especially the Ombudsperson would satisfy 
the requirements set by the CJEU.318 Others are not as optimistic. The WP29 noted in its opinion 
to the draft Privacy Shield that the new recourse mechanisms may be too complicated and 
therefore ineffective. They also raised concerns whether the Ombudsperson is actually effec-
tive.319 Also many privacy activists have though that the system is too complex.320  
The CJEU in the Schrems judgement stated that there has to be an opportunity to seek an effec-
tive remedy before a tribunal.321 This does not necessarily mean that there has to be a judicial 
remedy before a traditional court. In fact, access to an alternative dispute resolution mechanism 
can sometimes make access to justice easier and quicker, as the traditional courts are struggling 
under a heavy caseload. Court proceedings can also be ‘heavy’ for the individual herself and 
could even outweigh the benefits of receiving a judicial remedy. It is also not guaranteed that 
the remedy awarded by a court would be any better than a remedy awarded by some out-of-
court arbitral tribunal. Out-of-court dispute resolution can bring multiple advantages, most no-
table it is generally speedier and more cost effective.322  
Therefore, in principle, I am not against the fact that the Privacy Shield offers so many redress 
options that are outside the traditional courts. However, there are quite a few options, especially 
for proceedings against private companies that the multiple options may seem like a jungle. At 
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first glance the Privacy Shield seems to offer a multitude of redress options, but a better look 
into the terms reveals that the system is quite complicated. Not only that that there are gaps and 
obscurities. 
Firstly, if one wishes to bring a claim against a private company, one should approach the US 
company first. It is not an obligation, and the EU data subject could skip this and go directly to 
the alternative dispute resolution body chosen by the company, the DPA or the FTC, but it 
would make sense to try to solve the dispute directly with the company in order to avoid lengthy 
procedures.  
However, if this option is not satisfactory, the data subject may proceed to the alternative dis-
pute resolution body chosen by the company (ADR body), or the DPA if the company has 
chosen it as its ADR body or in case of human resources data, the DPA option is always avail-
able. Or even if the DPA is not the chosen ADR body, or it is not the matter of human resources 
data, the DPA option is still available, since the DPA can then refer the case to the FTC or the 
DoC or suspend the data transfer. This can be confusing, but basically the option is between the 
ADR body or the DPA. Unless the DPA is the chosen ADR body, in which case the only option 
is the DPA (or one could also skip that and proceed to the FTC directly). From the remedial 
point of view these two are different. The ADR body ought to be able to afford a remedy that 
has the effect of reversing or correcting the effects of non-compliance, or terminating the data 
transfer, whereas the DPA can only refer the case to the FTC or the DoC or suspend the data 
transfer, but not really afford any remedies. Thus it would seem that the independent ADR may 
be a better option for the EU data subject despite the fact that there could be practical difficulties 
in dealing with an ADR body if it is located in the US, like I discussed above. Hence, the 
remedies could be dependent on which dispute resolution option the US company has chosen. 
Then, if the ADR body is not satisfactory or available, the DPA may forward the matter to the 
DPA or the FTC. Or the data subject may choose to complain to the FTC directly without the 
involvement of the DPA. If the matter is forwarded to the DoC its powers are limited to remov-
ing the relevant US organisation from the Privacy Shield list, but it cannot award remedies for 
the damage already suffered. FTC’s powers of granting remedies are limited as well. First of 
all, the powers are limited to Section 5 of the FTC Act, which, as I have already stated, excludes 
some notable fields. And secondly, the FTC cannot award monetary remedies, but those have 
to be sought through the US courts. Thirdly, the FTC requires substantial damage or actual 
injury, which in the case of personal data can be hard to prove. Hence, if the independent ADR 
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body is not available, the remedies available are removal of the US company from the Privacy 
Shield list and termination of further data transfer. Neither of these would have the effect of 
remedying the damage already suffered, but rather just preventing further damage. Should the 
EU data subject still want compensation for the damage suffered he or she has to go to the US 
courts. 
However, there is another hurdle, the Privacy Shield Panel, the last resort. As I have discussed 
above the powers of the Panel to grant remedies are limited to non-monetary equitable relief. 
Although monetary remedies are not required either in the case law of the CJEU or the ECtHR, 
the case may be that there would not be any opportunity to get monetary remedy, if they are not 
available at the earlier stages either. Although, in my opinion, I do not see that monetary com-
pensation is necessary. A non-monetary remedy, which could be for instance, correction, dele-
tion or returning of the personal data to the data subject, may be satisfactory if it has the effect 
of correcting or reversing the effect of non-compliance, and thus be in line with Article 47(1) 
of the Charter.323 
In data protection issues the remedy concept is complicated. One of the things that is essential 
for an effective and working redress mechanism system in data protection issues, that the data 
subjects have access and knowledge about the different redress options available.324 Also it is 
difficult to determine what would be the appropriate remedy, especially in cases where there is 
not material loss.325 The effectiveness of redress is difficult because ‘the characterization of any  
compensation awarded to individuals is likely to be key in determining its enforceability in 
third countries.’326 The main challenges for effective redress in data protection would thus be 
assessing the ‘quantum of damage’ and bringing claims against data controllers in third coun-
tries.327 
There is another issue which has become obvious by now. There are a considerable number of 
steps to be taken, to seek redress and receive an effective remedy. Or there may be, should the 
first options not be satisfactory. With regards to mandatory dispute resolution before being able 
to come before a court, the CJEU has considered that such a requirement is not inconsistent 
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with the principle of effective judicial protection as long as the settlement is not binding on the 
parties, it does not cause a substantial delay, the time-barring of claims is suspended and it does 
not give rise to any costs (or has very low costs).328  
Out of the six redress options available for challenging private companies, only the last one, the 
Privacy Shield Panel, bear costs. The other ones are meant to be free of charge. Therefore I 
might conclude that these options do not give rise to costs that would be inconsistent with the 
principle of effective judicial protection. The Privacy Shield Decision does not specify whether 
claims would be time barred, so I cannot asses that. With regards to substantial delay, there is 
a chance that the very complicated structure of the redress routes of the Privacy Shield may 
impose an obstacle to the principle of effective judicial protection. For instance, the procedure 
could have taken 45 days at the company itself, then 60 + 25 days at the DPA, 90 days at the 
DoC and then another 90 days at the Privacy Shield Panel, thus adding up to 310 days. Of 
course the procedure may not take this long, but it could. The procedures could thus cause 
substantial delay. Lastly, the procedure must not prevent the parties from bringing judicial pro-
ceedings, i.e. be binding. The Privacy Shield does not prevent this, although there may be ob-
stacles under US law. 
For this I would conclude that I agree with the WP29 that the system for the complaints against 
private companies is very complicated which may result in the ineffectiveness of the entire 
system. This ineffectiveness may then result that effective redress is not available and thus the 
requirements of Article 47 of the Charter are not fulfilled, which in turn means that there are 
not effective safeguards to protect personal data and the Right under Article 8 of the Charter.  
Judicial remedies are not always the most effective means, inconsistencies in the application of 
the law and the availability of remedies, and most importantly when a third country is involved, 
the problems of jurisdiction, lead to gaps in redress. Although when it comes to third countries, 
ensuring effective redress is more difficult because the procedural steps, approach of courts and 
resources that are available to supervisory authorities may significantly differ.329 
The courts are not always the best places to seek redress and different out-of-court dispute 
resolution options may actually be more effective means of seeking redress. They can be 
quicker and more cost-effective ways of solving disputes (and also lightening the caseload of 
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traditional courts). However, if their powers of granting remedies are limited, they do not really 
offer a good alternative to the courts, nor are they satisfactory from the point of view of EU 
fundamental rights, most notable Article 47 of the Charter. Additionally such a complicated 
system, where there are several instances with slightly different powers, creates an environment 
where the case can always be forwarded to another body and nobody is responsible of ensuring 
that the damage or injury suffered is properly remedied. 
With regards to claims against US public authorities, there are other opportunities to seek re-
dress under US, other than the Ombudsperson mechanism that I have reviewed above.330 Since 
I have left review of US law outside the scope of this study, so I shall not say anything about 
those other options. The Ombudsperson mechanism itself is relatively straightforward, despite 
fact that the Ombudsperson may not have sufficient investigatory powers and not being able to 
confirm if the EU data subject has been targeted by surveillance. (Although if a remedy has 
been awarded, would that not be an indication that there has been a breach of some sort?) 
Yet, the claims against US public authorities could be barred at an early stage. When the indi-
vidual EU data subject wishes to raise a complaint against a US public authority, the DPAs can 
help to make sure that the submission is complete.331 This is good, as it will be considerably 
easier to deal with a local body, even just for linguistic reasons, but the DPAs still seems to 
have a considerable power to bar certain claims. The Privacy Shield decision says that the claim 
must not be ‘frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith.’332 As I mentioned above the Irish Data 
Protection Commissioner rejected the claim of Max Schrems on the basis that it was frivolous 
and vexatious.333 Although I do think it is pointless of exhausting the Ombudsperson with com-
pletely ridiculous and unfounded claims, I must say that the terms ‘frivolous’ and ‘vexatious’ 
are rather vague. The claim of Max Schrems was considered frivolous because the Commission 
had already decided that the level of data protection in the US was adequate under the Safe 
Harbour arrangement, but then it turned out that it was not. I question, how to define ‘frivolous’ 
or ‘vexatious’ in the context of data protection? 
Hence I have assessed the redress mechanism offered in the Privacy Shield using the criteria 
established by the CJEU in the Schrems case. The question is whether the Privacy Shield would 
                                                          
330 E.g. under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Access to documents could be sought through the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 ‘The Privacy Shield 
Decision’, Annex 2, Annex VI, V. Redress. 
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332 ‘The Privacy Shield Decision’, Annex 2, Annex III, Annex A, 3.b.iv. 
333 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, [2013 No. 765JR], [2014], IEHC 310, paras. 30‒33. 
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pass that test. Considering all the thing discussed above, although I think that the Privacy Shield 
is certainly an improvement in comparison to its predecessor the Safe Harbour, I have to con-
clude that in my opinion the redress mechanism of the Privacy Shield are not in concordant 
with the Article 47 of the Charter334, particularly with regards to the difficulties in seeking re-
dress because of the complicated structure and the necessity of exhausting sometime several 
different dispute resolution stages and also the time delays that this is going to cause. The test 
set by the CJEU would thus not be passed. 
Max Schrems calls the Privacy Shield a ‘soft update’ to the Safe Harbour and ‘absolutely laugh-
able’, because it does not address the issues raised by the CJEU.335 I agree with him. And I must 
add that because of the lack of effective redress options, the Privacy Shield does not effectively 
guarantee the right to protection of personal data as it is found in Article 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, because the requirements of Article 47 of the Charter are not sufficiently 
met. And it is Article 47 of the Charter that in the last place has the effect of guaranteeing the 
rights of the Charter. Without it, the right to protection of personal data would be nothing but a 
dead letter. Despite the Privacy Shield has introduced improvements compared to the Safe Har-
bour, those only seemingly improve data protection. 
A word or two ought to be said about the possibility of limiting the access to justice. In the case 
law of the CJEU it has been established that the principle of proportionality must be taken into 
consideration and limitations of rights must not go beyond what is necessary and appropriate. 336  
Although fundamental rights must be in certain circumstances reconciled with other interests. 337  
The question is whether the economic interests of the data-driven economy an override the right 
to data protection and access to justice. Fundamental rights can be restricted only to attain ob-
jectives of general interest and the restriction cannot be disproportionate.338 Given the im-
portance and weight that the CJEU has given to data protection in the recent years especially 
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with regards to balancing it with national security339 or economic interest340 I would anticipate 
the scale to turn towards data protection. 
 
 
4.2.  Effects of EU Data Protection Reform 
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, EU data protection legislation in going through a reform. That is 
why it is necessary to take that into consideration. The Data Protection Directive (DPD)341 will 
be replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)342 and also by a directive that 
relates to data protection in the field in crime prevention.343 The details of this reform are not 
necessary here. However, the GDPR, which will become fully applicable in May 2018,344 may 
have implications on the ability of EU citizens to seek redress from US data processors and 
controllers, so I must briefly discuss those changes. The regulation shall not have an effect on 
the validity of the Privacy Shield, which shall remain in force,345 but certain changes extend the 
reach of Union law. Also as I mentioned in Chapter 2, the ‘adequacy requirement’ of EU law 
for data transfers outside the Union and Adequacy Decision remains in place.346 Importantly 
also the Commission when deciding on the adequacy must take into consideration inter alia 
‘effective administrative and judicial redress for the data subjects’.347 
The GDPR takes a significant step towards regulating transborder data flows.348 The most no-
table change is increased territorial scope. Thus the rules of the regulation shall apply to also 
non-EU based businesses, such as US companies, when they are offering goods and services or 
monitoring EU behaviour.349 For the EU data subject that means that he or she can rely on all 
                                                          
339 See Case C-293/12 - Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, para. 41 and 52. 
340 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, para. 91. 
341 Directive 95/46/EC, (Data Protection Directive). 
342 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (General Data Protection Regulation). 
343 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of 
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penal-
ties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
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346 Art. 45, General Data Protection Regulation. 
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the rights guaranteed in the regulation even when the data controller or the processor is based 
in the US. Reviewing all of them is outside the scope of this study, but I shall discuss the rele-
vant provisions of the regulation that relate to the ability data subjects to seek redress.  
Hence, first of all, the data subject will be able to make a complaint with the supervisory au-
thority in their own Member State.350 Also proceedings can be brought in the courts of the 
Member State where the data subject is resident.351 This will make the complaint procedure 
easier in practice and satisfy the requirement of ‘an independent and impartial tribunal previ-
ously established by law’ of Article 47(2) of the Charter.352 
The data subject shall also have a right to an effective remedy.353 There is a right to compensa-
tion for any material or non-material damage caused.354 The GDPR does not make any reference 
as to what exactly would be the adequate remedy for data protection breaches.355 But if it satis-
fies the requirements of effectiveness and equivalence set by the CJEU it ought to be suffi-
cient.356 The requirement of an ‘effective remedy’ in Article 47(1) of the Charter357 would thus 
be satisfied. 
One important difference to note is that the Privacy Shield only applies to processing of per-
sonal data by US organisations in the case that the processing does not already fall within the 
scope of Union legislation.358 The new GDPR could thus limit the extent of the Privacy Shield. 
  
                                                          
350 Art. 77(1), General Data Protection Regulation. 
351 Art. 79(2), General Data Protection Regulation. 
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5. Conclusions 
  
 
5.1. Thoughts on Redress Mechanisms  
 
In the previous Chapters I have assessed the redress mechanisms of the Privacy Shield using 
the Schrems criteria. The CJEU established in that case that individuals must have the right to 
effective judicial protection and seek remedies, as required by Article 47 of the Charter.359 By 
reviewing the redress mechanisms of the Privacy Shield in light of Article 47 of the Charter I 
came to the conclusion that, in my view, the Privacy Shield would not pass the test. Despite the 
Privacy Shield is a significant step from the Safe Harbour, it is not quite satisfactory. In this 
part I wish to summarize what has been discussed throughout this study and add my own 
thoughts. 
The Privacy Shield introduced many improvements compared to the Privacy Shield, more re-
dress mechanisms also against public authorities. The Ombudsperson is arguably the most im-
portant addition. I also find that it is good that the European Data Protection authorities (DPAs) 
have slightly better opportunities to help EU citizens under the Privacy Shield, even if only by 
assisting with the communication with US organisations or by forwarding the case to US au-
thorities. In that sense it is a step up. 
However, there are still deficiencies. The first point I already mentioned in the previous Chap-
ter, the remedies may be dependent on the dispute resolution method chosen by the US com-
pany. I came to the conclusion that since the independent ADR body can accord remedies which 
have the effect of reversing or correcting the effects of non-compliance or even terminating the 
processing, it would be a better option than the DPA, which does not have powers like these. 
The latter can only refer the case to the FTC or the DoC. The former can only do so if the US 
company in question fails to comply with its judgement. This means two things. For one, if the 
ADR body is the chosen method, there is an opportunity to receive an effective remedy or as 
required in article 47(1) of the Charter and the case law of the CJEU. For two, if the chosen 
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method is cooperation with the DPA, remedies available are dependent on the powers of the 
FTC and the DoC. 
The DoC can only try to find a resolution or remove the company from the Privacy Shield list. 
It is unclear whether these could be a good and satisfactory remedies. Similarly the powers of 
the FTC to grant remedies are limited. I already mentioned that certain fields are excluded from 
the jurisdiction the FTC. Further remedies would still have to be sought through US courts. It 
is unclear whether either of these options can be satisfactory from the European point of view.  
It is questionable whether the FTC and the DoC have powers to reverse or correct the effects 
of non-compliance. Thus it can be also be concluded that access to an effective remedy may be 
depended on the dispute resolution body that the US company has chosen. It means that if the 
chosen body is the DPA, there might not be an opportunity to seek an effective remedy. One 
can really question why the different redress routes of the Privacy Shield lead to such different 
results. This can lead to courtroom shopping, the EU data subject has to think what end results 
he or she wants to achieve. 
The second criticism I wish to make is that the Privacy Shield Panel as a last resort is mislead-
ing. As access to US courts even after the arbitration of the Panel is still possible, although it 
could be limited by rules of US law. I also noted that the fact that the Panel cannot award 
monetary remedies can be disappointing, especially if such remedies have not been awarded at 
the earlier stages. Despite monetary remedies are not required in the case law of the CJEU, in 
my view there ought to be an opportunity to seek them, especially if financial losses have been 
suffered as a result to non-compliance with the Privacy Shield. For instance in the case law of 
the ECtHR it has been established that ‘a remedy must be capable of remedying directly the 
impugned state of affairs.’360 I am questioning whether, if the loss suffered is pecuniary, can a 
non-monetary compensation directly remedy it. One could argue that it would not. Despite 
monetary remedies could then still be sought in US courts, one could the question whether the 
process is the too complicated and lengthy. 
Which brings me to my next point, which is the requirement of ADR before access to traditional 
courts. I came to the conclusion that ADR as such is not restricting the enjoyment of the rights 
under Article 47 of the Charter. In fact, ADR can sometimes offer an easier and more effective 
redress route, which can be a positive thing for both the EU citizen and the US organisation in 
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question. However, the complexity of the redress mechanism and the multiple steps to be taken 
could mean that it is not acceptable from the perspective of EU law. I referred to CJEU case, 
where the court decided that as such ARD is not a problem, as long as does not cause a sub-
stantial delay, the time-barring of claims is suspended and it does not give rise to any costs (or 
has very low costs).361 I have left the compatibility of ADR and Article 47 of the Charter outside 
the scope of this thesis, and therefore I am not going to discuss this further. Suffices to note 
here that, in my view, I do not see why an out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms could 
not satisfy the requirements of Article 47, but then that ADR body ought to have sufficient 
powers to conduct fair procedures and award effective remedies. And as was stated above, not 
all the bodies that are empowered to solve these disputes under the Privacy Shield seem to have 
such powers. 
Somewhat related to this is the requirement of independent and impartial tribunal, as required 
by Article 47(2) of the Charter. In fact, the independence of all of the Privacy Shield ‘tribunals’ 
could be questioned. In my view the most suspicious is the Ombudsperson, which, as I have 
discussed, does not seem to have very extensive powers to conduct independent investigations. 
I also concluded that the Privacy Shield is quite complex, thus agreeing with the WP29 and 
many privacy activists.362 The fact that there can be multiple redress routes to exhaust is cer-
tainly evidence that the system is complex. Another issue that adds to the complexity is the 
issues that I have elaborated above, the choice of the recourse mechanisms by the US company 
may lead to different results as far as remedies and also the procedures conducted.  Related to 
the complexity is the time of the proceedings. If the EU data subject has to exhaust multiple 
redress steps, the length of the proceedings could extent to what could be considered unreason-
able, thus incompatible with the requirement of reasonable time of Article 47(2) of the Charter. 
According to CJEU the reasonableness is dependent on the circumstances.363 I question, 
whether the complexity of the Privacy Shield redress mechanisms and the multiple steps can 
be justify lengthy proceedings. 
In addition, the procedures vary. I have discussed in the previous Chapter that the requirement 
of fair and public hearing that is required by Article 47(2) does not seem to be satisfied, at least 
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not with the DPA, FTC, DoC and the Ombudsperson alternatives. Or more precisely, from the 
Privacy Shield document itself it cannot be said with certainty that the requirement is satisfied.  
Further criticism is about the Ombudsperson. I do see it as a massive improvement, that the 
Privacy Shield introduced a mechanism to seek redress against US public authorities. Still I 
came to the conclusion that the Ombudsperson is a rather odd procedure where the EU data 
subject cannot have much say in the proceedings. Nor can the effectiveness of the potential 
remedies be assessed since the Ombudsperson does not confirm whether the EU data subject 
has even been a target of surveillance. Although I do understand that this issue falls under the 
very sensitive top secret category, since it is a matter of US national security, I still think that 
from the viewpoint of EU data protection law and Article 47 of the Charter, this is not satisfac-
tory.  
From these considerations and also the discussions in the previous Chapters I would thus argue 
that the Privacy Shield would not pass the criteria established by the CJEU in the Schrems case. 
Hence I share my doubts about the Privacy Shield with Max Schrems, who does not believe in 
the regime.364 In particular, I think it the remedies are not necessarily effective under all the 
redress options. Fair and public hearing is not always satisfied, the independence and impar-
tiality of the different options could be questions and lastly, the potentially lengthy procedure 
might not satisfy the requirement of reasonable time. 
Yet, I also discussed the data protection legislation reform in the EU and what changes the 
GDPR could bring in terms of EU data subject being able to seek redress from US data proces-
sors. I think the extended reach of EU data protection law, the increased territorial scope could 
have its effect. Although, the new regulation may potentially strengthen the rights of EU data 
subjects, it should not have an effect on the compatibility of the Privacy Shield Decision with 
EU law and CJEU case law. 
 
 
5.2. Tension between Data Protection and the Economy 
 
As I have discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, the aim of the EU data protection legislation is not 
merely the giving effect to the fundamental right of data protection, but also the free flow of 
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data. That data has extensive economic value, and the free flow of data can lead to major eco-
nomic advancements. The dual objectives of EU data protection legislation are not the main 
focus of this study. They are nevertheless important, and therefore I shall only make a brief 
note about them. 
When the Schrems decision was made, the invalidation of the Safe Harbour has an immediate 
effect, putting the data transfers across the Atlantic to a complete halt, until organisations were 
able to negotiate other means of transferring personal data. Decisions of the CJEU can have a 
very strong impact restricting international data flows. From an economic perspective this is 
not desirable. The approach of the CJEU is that the data protection in the third country where 
the data is transferred has to be ‘essentially equivalent.’365 This sets the standard very high. 
Invalidation of the Adequacy Decision has a direct effect on the economy, because the re-
striction of data flows leads to economic losses. But the CJEU could also indirectly effect data 
flows and the economy. By setting the standards of data protection high, the Court could have 
the indirect effect of isolating EU from the world markets, if the third countries, such as the US 
will not comply with those standards.366 Some think that the Court does not take into consider-
ation that EU has to function on a global scale.367 US firms feel increasingly pressured by Eu-
ropean data protection rules and even the fear that EU law may become de facto standard. The 
Europeans are afraid of being subjected to data protection laws that do not reflect their interest. 
Also American firms reluctant to accept EU Adequacy Decision rules and Europeans are reluc-
tant to US data protection as adequate. When there is a deep disagreement about the basic values 
of data protection any optimal solution could be deemed as illegitimate on either side of the 
Atlantic.368    
The implications of CJEU case law on economy would require further study. Nevertheless, I 
saw it as appropriate to make a point that the decisions of the Court could have such effects and 
those ought to be taken into consideration, when determining the faith of the Adequacy Deci-
sion. That should also be the responsibility of the Court, since in its own case law it has stated 
that data protection is not an absolute right and has to be reconciled with other interest.369 
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5.3. Suggestions and Solutions 
 
In this part I wish to review some suggested solutions to address these problems that I have 
discussed throughout this study and make some suggestions of my own. I have not reviewed all 
potential suggestions, but only I wish to discuss some that are, in my view, most viable. 
A good suggestion in my opinion would be cooperation between the relevant US and EU data 
protection authorities allowing easier access to redress. This suggestion was put forward at an 
International Privacy Conference. According to this suggestion information should be made 
available how to exactly bring a claim in data protection issues. Also the Article 29 Working 
Party, DPAs and the FTC ought to collaborate in dealing with cross-border complaints.370 This 
option would not require any heavy legislative changes and could thus be achieved with relative 
ease. This is good, because some basic guidance in bringing claims and seeking redress from a 
data processor located in a third country is arguably needed for EU data subjects. And as this 
research has shown the redress mechanisms under the Privacy Shield are complicated. How-
ever, mere information as to how to bring claims would not solve the other problems with the 
Privacy Shied, such as questionable independence of the bodies responsible for dispute resolu-
tion, the lack of fair and public hearing and effective remedies. 
Another solution that have been suggested to solve transatlantic data protection problems is an 
intergovernmental body that would have the power to pass guidelines and try to find the polit-
ical consensus.371 This could ultimately lead to a new bilateral agreement between the EU and 
the US, or potentially making changes to the existing one. In my view, this option is consider-
able in the long run, although it would take too much time to solve immediate issues. Also, 
some think that international law would have little to add because of national security excep-
tions the limits of international human rights law.372 Given the fundamental difference in the 
approach to data protection by the EU and US, co-operation could also be difficult. The history 
of international co-operation in consumer protection issues in electronic commerce has not been 
very successful and it would be unrealistic to expect that consensus could be achieved over data 
protection.373 
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One option would be giving the European data protection authorities more powers in terms 
helping EU citizens seeking redress from US actors. As discussed above, the powers of the 
DPAs are limited to some extent. For instance the WP29 has suggested that the DPAs could 
assist to navigate the US legal system as well as a help with language difficulties.374 According 
to the Privacy Shield, the DPAs already have a role of assisting EU data subjects in seeking 
redress, such as with the Ombudsperson. But potentially, the powers could be extended, so the 
DPAs could assist in all matters. That would make dealing with the US organisations, and also 
ADR bodies that are located in the US, easier in practice. Although that would mean that the 
resources of the DPAs would have to be significantly raised. Rules would also have to be de-
fined, for instance, whether the DPA is meant to give legal assistance. In my view, there could 
be at least a contact point who could give information, how to start proceedings and what op-
tions there are.  
It has also been suggested that EU data subject ought to be able to bring claims in EU courts  
as well as US organisations ought to sue ADR bodies located in the EU, so that EU citizens 
would have easier access to justice.375 Being able to access courts on European soil would ease 
the dispute proceedings significantly. And with the territorial expansion of the GDPR that may 
soon become a reality. It is not all clear, though, how keen US companies would be about this.  
Also the entire Adequacy Decision system could be abolished. According to Kuner, the Ade-
quacy Decision system is ‘cumbersome, expensive, slow, and sends a wrong message to third 
countries’.376 The adequacy principle is not really a principle of data protection but it rather just 
serves a political need to prevent circumvention of EU law.377 Kuner would suggest that in-
creasing accountability and allowing individuals easier access to enforce their rights and redress 
would be an alternative to the Adequacy Decisions. Because of the difficulty of enforcing EU 
data protection rules outside the EU, the adequacy systems does not work, and instead account-
ability option he suggests would allow data subjects to seek remedy in their own country. 378 
Data subject must be given realistic opportunities to seek redress.379 Transparency is also a key 
in enforcing data protection rights in cross-border situations.380 
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Considering that the current Data Protection Directive and the new GDPR both require that 
transfers can only take place when the level of protection in the destination country is adequate, 
the departure from the Adequacy Decision system would require a legislative change. And I do 
not see how such a change could take place any time soon, despite it could be a solution in the 
long run. 
As for increasing accountability and transparency, I see them as very good suggestions. As I 
have argued in this thesis, the Privacy Shield does not, despite its multiple redress options, still 
offer satisfactory opportunities to seek redress. The question is, how to offer realistic opportu-
nities to redress. As this research has shown, different redress routes of the Privacy Shield lead 
to slightly different results, which in my view is a weakness. EU data subject ought to have the 
same opportunity to seek effective compensation despite the recourse route chosen by the US 
company. As I have stated, I do not see that ADR as such is necessarily the problem. Rather, 
access to ADR ought to be the same in all disputes. Likewise, access to judicial dispute resolu-
tion should not be a difficult as it is. 
My own view is that the major weakness with the redress mechanisms of the Privacy Shield is 
its complexity. This is why, my own suggestion would be to simplify the system drastically. At 
the moment there seems to be too many options, instead there ought to be just instance where 
EU data subjects could turn to seek advice on how to seek redress. A natural solution would be 
that the DPAs would have this advisory role, since they already have knowledge in data pro-
tections issues. And since the legislative changes taking place, with the becoming of applicable 
of the GDRP, that gives national DPA more extensive powers, it would be suitable.381 
I do think that access to courts, even European, ought not to be restricted. Still I would encour-
age ADR as an alternative. However, contrary to what the Privacy Shield now offers, all EU 
data subjects ought to have the same ADR option available, and that ought not to be dependent 
on the US organisation. I questioned in my arguments, the independency of the ADR body 
chosen by the US organisation. In my view, the Privacy Shield Panel, where the arbitrators are 
chosen from a pool nominated by the DoC and the Commission seems more unbiased. In that 
way the EU data subject would also have a choice of an arbitrator like the US company. Instead 
of last resort, I would prefer if the arbitration option was available immediately, or at least after 
consultations with the company itself. Hence, I think all EU data subject ought to have the 
opportunity to seek redress through arbitration. Likewise this arbitration tribunal then ought to 
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have the obligation to forward the matter to the FTC or the DoC, when applicable. This would 
solve the problem of different results with different redress routes. Also the ADR tribunals 
ought to then have powers to award effective remedies that could reverse or correct the effects 
of non-compliance. In my view, monetary remedies ought to be available, especially when the 
damages are pecuniary. 
Although, I must add, that in my view, even mediation could be equally considerable option as 
arbitration. Potentially, the ADR option that thus would be available to all disputes could be 
also mediation. However, the differences of arbitration and mediation are not the topic of this 
study, so I shall not discuss it further. 
Access to judicial dispute resolution should not be restricted. Instead it ought to be an option to 
ADR. EU data subjects should thus have the opportunity to choose between judicial and non-
judicial dispute resolution, judicial execution still being available after the judgement of an 
ADR tribunal. The DPAs, as advisors, could inform data subjects about the pros and cons of 
either of this options. Because of the limitations of EU law and access to US courts in data 
protection issues, access ought to be allowed in European courts, although access to US courts 
should still be allowed, when it is possible. 
These changes could solve the main problems I have found with the Privacy Shield. EU data 
subjects would have the opportunity to seek effective remedies, either through ADR or courts. 
Also the requirement of ‘a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal previously established by law’ of Article 47(2) would more likely to be 
satisfied. The requirements of equality of arms, adversarial proceedings, reasoned decision and 
judicial execution could also be satisfied, even in ADR proceedings. Some reasonable 
timeframe for the ADR proceedings ought to be defined. In my view approximately 3 months 
is reasonable for arbitration proceedings. One has to consider the cross-border element, with 
the parties located on either side of the Atlantic, there are obviously some practical difficulties. 
However, with the digital development, online proceedings could be an option. 
I am doubtful, however, whether these suggestions could be applied to disputes with US public 
authorities. Development in this area could require more cooperation between the EU and the 
US. And that cooperation could be very difficult given the fundamental differences in data 
protection and also the political issues involved. Although some think that  the need to provide 
better data protection for EU citizens may shift the dynamic of global data protection and lead 
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the US to create more meaningful data protection laws.382 Despite I agree that the EU has wide 
reaching effects on data protection on a global scale, I doubt that the US would be willing to 
accept EU dominance in the field and adopt EU standards of data protection. 
Instead, what could be a viable solution in the long run, is a departure from the traditional 
geographical approach to legislation and borderless internet. Restrictions on the flow of data 
across borders because of privacy and data protection concerns can undermine the potential of 
the Internet as a commercial platform.383 The solution for the data protection dispute could be 
found in the departure from the traditional geographic thinking, non-territorial forms of juris-
diction, overlapping political authorities, and harmonization through international organisa-
tions. Effective global governance can be achieved through reconceptualising of political space 
and jurisdiction.384 Arguably, EU data protection would lack teeth if it did not have effects 
outside the EU, cross-border data flows are inevitable in the world of internet and thus legisla-
tive spill-over cannot be avoided. The traditional Westphalian international system assumes 
jurisdictional conflicts as exceptions, but would it not be reasonable to assume them rather as a 
rule in the increasing geographical ambiguity of transnational economic transactions. Recon-
ceptualization of jurisdictional and political community may be needed.385 The solution could 
thus be a completely different approach to data protection, which would not be territorial. 
According to Kuner, the European Data Protection legislation is nothing but an illusion, Euro-
peans like to think that it provides seamless protection in data transfer situations and the hands 
of EU laws would reach outside the border of the EU. But Kuner thinks, this is not possible in 
practice, since data cannot be protected on a larger scale and intelligence surveillance cannot 
be completely prevented. He also considerers that the Privacy Shield is weak attempt to provide 
complete protection with mechanism that are ‘lengthy, untransparent, formalistic, and unintel-
ligible to the average individual.’386 
The Schrems has also been criticized for establishing unattainable and hypocritical standards. 
It may also undermine the authority of EU in the field of data protection.387 Although some 
think that the case could have opposite effect, strengthening the role of EU as the world leader 
                                                          
382 Davies, (2015), p. 58. 
383 Meltzer, (2014), p. 97. 
384 Kobrin, (2014), p. 129‒130. 
385 Kobrin, (2014), p. 112‒113. 
386 Kuner, (2016), p. 4. 
387 NiLoidean, (2016), p. 6. 
77 
   
in data protection albeit it might have implications on international trade.388  Kuner thinks that 
EU data protection standards cannot be set so high, that is impossible for third countries to 
attain them. And in a pluralistic world it is necessary to leave from the local approaches, espe-
cially in the field of data protection. Also considering that the United States is liberal democracy 
with strong cultural and historical ties with Europe, the protection of data across the Atlantic 
ought to be easy. The Schrems judgement does not actually lead to better data protection. Kuner 
thinks that the case is an example of ‘human rights “petrified into a legalistic paradigm”’ as 
stated by Martti Koskenniemi.389  Koskenniemi’s argument is basically that when human rights 
(such as data protection) become institutionalised values and interests are marginalised to 
rights-language and their transformative effect is lost and they thus are ‘petrified into a legalistic 
paradigm.’390 This is political aim.391 Rights are also constantly weighed against other notions 
of good, there is a constant conflict and any balancing exercise is done based on political and 
cultural preferences.392 Rights are ‘indistinguishable from policy’.393  
Hence, a departure from the European fundamental rights approach and an attempt to enforce 
EU standards and instead take a step towards breaking national borders is something that I see 
somewhere in the distant future. However, this would require international cooperation and it 
would take time. Ensuring effective redress is definitely a more immediate solution. According 
to Max Schrems, data protection is entering an era where it needs to be effectively enforcea-
ble.394 Given the growing importance of data, I agree. Still, seeking redress in transatlantic sit-
uations is not easy. 
The political environment in the US does not seem very open to allowing crossborder dispute 
resolution in data protection issues. Recent developments in the United States might prove out 
to be disastrous for the ability of EU citizens to challenge US organisations for data breaches. 
In January 2017 President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order which could conflict with 
the Privacy Shield and threaten the attempt of the EU to strengthen data protection of EU citi-
zens.395  Section 14 of the Executive Order would exclude EU citizens from the protections of 
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the Privacy Act.396 Even though it is not legislation, the Order does raise questions which di-
rection is the transatlantic relationship going in terms of data protection.397 
The Privacy Shield is planned to be jointly review for the first time in the summer of 2017. This 
is an opportunity to make changes to the regime.398 This is certainly called for, with the GDPR 
soon becoming applicable and also the specific problems that I have highlighted with regards 
to the redress mechanisms of the Privacy Shield. 
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